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FOREWORD
Assessing longer term trends may seem like a manageable task. But in the world of rapid technological
innovations and growing complexity, it turns into a
more difficult enterprise. Yet this is what Mr. Roman
Muzalevsky, a strategic affairs analyst, achieves in his
visionary assessment of a strategic landscape and operational threat environment likely to emerge by 2050.
Muzalevsky contends that, absent major policy failures, the U.S. military will remain the strongest in the
coming decades, although a series of functional and
regional megatrends will prove a monumental challenge, exposing the United States to “crises and opportunities on the battlefield and in the market.” The U.S.
military, he continues, will need to adapt to and shape
these dynamics to retain its edge. Among other developments, the author especially highlights the emerging
military revolution, which will feature transformations
across multiple domains and face a counter-revolution
in the form of responses by societies and select state
and nonstate actors. Muzalevsky further points to the
growing military and the strategic importance of the
Arctic, in addition to assessing the emergence of China
and India as major economic and military rivals.
Assessing each megatrend’s trajectories and implications for the strategic landscape and operational
threat environment, the author presents a series of wild
cards―low probability but high-impact events challenging the U.S. military as well as global and regional
economic and security orders. Specifically, Muzalevsky walks us through a possible outsized unrest by the
unemployed youth in the Middle East; increased sea
levels and floods submerging megacities in Southeast
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Asia; the collapse of the economic and political system
in China; a mega cyberattack and a breakdown of the
Internet; an unauthorized use of force by fully autonomous weapons systems; and a military conflict in the
Arctic potentially involving nuclear-armed powers.
Analyzing the variety of linkages between the megatrends and their implications for the strategic landscape and operational threat environment, the author
points to what he terms as increased complexity, speed,
and intensity (CSI) of developments in the modern era
and ways they are likely to impact the international
system of 2050. As he argues:
the international system will become more unpredictable,
exposed to ‘circular causality’ featuring more ‘wild cards’
than in the previous century, despite technologies that
will help us create better risk management systems against
their own effects. Significant and rapid changes across
interconnected technological, economic, and social domains
will usher in the Era of Multiple Transformations.

In his analysis, the author relies on a clear content
structure, comprehensive overview of the megatrends,
detailed assessment of related implications, and a forward-looking and provoking scenario-making that
provides a nuanced perspective on a complex world of
2050. As Muzalevsky admits, the work relies “on relative simplicity to deal with absolute complexity,” providing policy recommendations for the U.S. military as
it responds to emerging challenges. It is with great pleasure that the Strategic Studies Institute presents this
work to the research and policy community exploring
strategic trends and the U.S. military transformation as
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they unfold and shape the operational threat environment and strategic landscape of the coming decades.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Barring major policy failures, the U.S. military
will still enjoy unrivaled capabilities in the coming
decades. But a series of megatrends and region-specific dynamics will challenge the U.S military and economic leadership, exposing the United States to crises
and opportunities on the battlefield and in the market.
These megatrends will define the evolving multicentric
system of interaction among actors, facilitating further
dispersion of influence that will undermine the U.S.
position as the most influential actor while enabling its
rivals to move up the ranks fast.
This system is expected to have neither the place
nor the tolerance for unipolarity, as once ascribed to the
United States in the 1990s. Instead, it will have plenty
of room for numerous actors exercising considerable
influence in different domains. The U.S. military will
need to adapt to these megatrends to retain its strategic
edge. Otherwise, protecting U.S. interests in a continuously evolving world will be a fruitless enterprise, one
that will hasten the perceived U.S. decline as the greatest military power the world has ever known.
This monograph helps explore and prepare for
the possible and the probable in a transformed world
of 2050. Relying on forecasting, scenarios, and wild
cards, it envisions the evolution of these megatrends
and an emerging operational threat environment and
strategic landscape for the U.S. military.
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STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE, 2050:
PREPARING THE U.S. MILITARY FOR
NEW ERA DYNAMICS
A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY AND STRATEGIC
LANDSCAPE
Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.1
							

— Niels Bohr

We must ask whether we are becoming so dependent on
communications links and electronic microprocessors
that a determined adversary or terrorist could possibly
shut down federal operations or damage the economy
simply by attacking our computers.2
						

— Senator Fred Thompson

Barring any major policy failures, the U.S. military will continue to enjoy unrivaled capabilities in
the coming decades. But a series of megatrends—
demographic, environmental, cultural, socio-economic, political, technological, and military, as well as
region-specific dynamics—will challenge U.S. global
leadership and its status as the strongest military,
exposing it to crises and opportunities on the battlefield and in the market. These megatrends will solidify
an already evolving multicentric system of interaction
among actors, facilitating further dispersion of influence that will undermine the U.S. position as the most
influential actor while enabling its rivals to move up
the ranks quickly. This system is expected to have neither the place nor the tolerance for unipolarity, as once
ascribed to the United States in the 1900s. Instead, it
will have plenty of room for numerous actors exercising considerable influence in different domains. China
and India will be emerging as peer rivals, certainly in
1

the economic and, increasingly, the military area. The
U.S. military will need to adapt to and shape these
megatrends in order to better navigate the new strategic landscape and retain its strategic edge in the
coming decades.
The demographic megatrend especially will entail
major economic, political, and military challenges. The
global population is projected to reach nine billion
by 2050. Demand for food, land, water, and energy
resources will increase drastically, straining production and supply networks and enhancing the risk of
intra- and interstate rivalries and conflicts. Technological advances will mitigate related pressures, but
not significantly or evenly across all regions. Coal and
hydrocarbons will likely remain the major sources of
energy overall. But the share of renewable and nuclear
energy in energy mixes will grow considerably, particularly in the industrialized countries. Renewables
will offer major operational advantages for militaries,
while the growing use of nuclear energy will likely
contribute to nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation. As the United States rebalances to Asia and reaps
the fruits of its energy revolution at home, its strategic
commitment to the oil and gas-rich Middle East will
decline significantly. Other states such as China and
India will increasingly play a greater role in providing
for security in the region.
Meanwhile, youth bulges in the Middle East,
sub-Saharan Africa, and Central Asia will be a source
of instability if regional governments fail to improve
the lives of local populations. Alternatively, they could
be a source of dynamic growth if the governments
leverage the labor pools effectively and pursue good
governance, inviting more investment funds rather
than troops and bullets. Increased urbanization will,
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in turn, prompt closer coordination between domestic
and overseas civilian and military agencies in protecting civilian populations in urban settings.
Environmental impacts will become more pronounced and harder to control. Extreme weather
events, such as flooding and droughts, will increase
in frequency and intensity in a number of regions.
Degraded and threatened environments will lead to
population displacements and refugee flows, exacerbating social tensions and prompting intra- or
interstate conflicts in select areas. The U.S. and other
militaries will be engaged in humanitarian and disaster relief operations more frequently and extensively.
This will be especially true for coastal zones, where
projected sea level increases herald more frequent and
particularly destructive natural disasters.
Meanwhile, continued advancements in information and communication technologies (ICTs) will
lead to increased efficiencies in civilian and military
sectors while producing more risks of cyber and terrorist attacks targeting civilian and military infrastructure. The informatization and robotization of armed
forces and war will grow in speed and scale in what
is already becoming the hallmark of an emerging military revolution. Entities of all types and sizes will use
unmanned systems on a wider scale to compensate for
labor shortages due to aging trends and promised efficiencies, leading to mass unemployment and unrest
absent better governance. The U.S. military will rely on
cyber and ICTs even more substantially. As a result, it
will be more vulnerable to information and cyber operations and will need a capability to operate off the grid.
While humans will still control the decision-making
regarding the initiation of war and use of military force,
the likely emergence of truly autonomous systems will
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create substantial risks of accidents, unauthorized
decisions, and ethical controversies that will define the
political landscapes of high-tech countries and militaries. The embedding of sensors into human bodies will
be increasingly likely, providing situational awareness,
health, and human performance advantages, certainly
for the militaries that will be keen to get their hands
on such technologies. Mind-controlled machinery will
become more sophisticated, with brain-to-brain communication possible. Hostile actors will increasingly
use previously unavailable technologies, such as 3-D
and 4-D, cyber, robotics, and drones, among others.
The United States will remain the leading user of precision strike and autonomous weapons, as well as
lead-developer of related defense capabilities. But the
proliferation and development of such technologies by
adversaries will undermine its position.3
This will apply to the U.S. space capabilities as
well. Many more actors will exploit space for military and civilian purposes because of reduced costs of
space vehicle manufacturing and launching. Enhanced
space capabilities will bring advantages to civilian economic sectors. But the risk of orbital collisions and
attacks against space assets will increase. The U.S. military could lose major advantages if others challenged
its space capabilities by degrading its command and
control, remotely piloted and early warning systems,
precision strike capabilities, battle damage assessment, logistics and navigation, weather forecasting,
and military planning functions. The militarization of
space emphasizing space control will accelerate in the
coming decades, challenging governance frameworks,
while fueling calls for space de-weaponization.4 The
emerging military revolution will, in turn, prompt a
counter-revolution marked by the development of
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asymmetric military capabilities, various legal regimes,
and societal responses.
As far as regional dynamics, stronger nationalism,
enhanced disagreements, conflicts over disputed territories, increased economic competition, and accelerating arms races will redefine the geopolitics of
most regions. The Indo-Asia-Pacific, the Global Commons, and the Arctic will be areas of especially sharp
interstate rivalries. Asia will once again become the
center of gravity, producing half of the global gross
domestic product (GDP) and becoming the largest
defense-spending region. The United States will have
the strongest and most advanced military, but China,
Russia, and India will trail close behind. China’s
defense expenditures are on track to match the U.S.
by 2050, with both states accounting for almost half
of the total global defense spending. India and Russia
will follow suit. The European Union (EU) states will
increase their defense expenditures as fears of U.S.
strategic retrenchment ebb and flow. But other primarily emerging powers might well outdo them.5
Meanwhile, the exploitation and militarization of
the Arctic will grow, as melting ice caps clear the passage for companies, ships, coast guards, and navies.
Increased business opportunities will go hand-in-hand
with enhanced risks of harassments of coast guards
and civilian ships, potentially leading to armed conflicts. The Middle East and North Africa, Central and
South Asia, and parts of Central and Latin America
will struggle to overcome demographic, social, environmental, and economic challenges. But success stories and geopolitical realignments will dot the world
map as well. More industrialized and knowledgeable
economies will emerge in the Middle East and Asia,
which will also see major geopolitical reconfigurations
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centered on China, Japan, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and Turkey. These and the previously mentioned
regional and functional developments will require
a recalibration of the U.S. military posture. This new
posture will increasingly and substantially focus on
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, the Arctic, Latin America,
and the Global Commons (especially in the space and
cyber domains).
But rapid changes across the functional and geographic areas might also contribute to wild cards—
low probability events causing systemic perturbations.
Such events help envision and prepare policies to
prevent or mitigate the impact of such developments.
Examples of such wild cards include: a cross-regional
unrest by unemployed youth tearing apart the greater
Middle East; increased sea levels and floods submerging megacities along the coastlines of Southeast Asia
and overwhelming global relief efforts; the collapse of
the Chinese economic and political systems leading
to massive socio-economic dislocations and sending
the global economy into a tailspin; a mega cyberattack
resulting in the breakdown of the Internet and full or
partial collapse of a national economic infrastructure;
the initiation of conflict or substantial increase in the
number of fatal incidents as a result of an unauthorized
use of force by the truly autonomous weapons systems
and self-aware robotics capable of challenging human
control; and military skirmishes, proxy conflicts, or
war in the Arctic potentially involving nuclear-armed
powers.
The strategic landscape and global operational
threat environment of 2050 will be more complex fundamentally. The diffusion of power fueled by the previously mentioned megatrends will result in a more
pronounced shift in influence from the Western to
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non-Western countries and a drastic shift of influence
from state to nonstate actors. Coalition-making rather
than alliance-making, as well as situational responses
and ad hoc bargaining, increasingly will define actors’
interactions. The state will remain the dominant unit.
But nonstate entities will occupy a much larger position
in the global system of relations, making their voice significantly louder and their ability to affect governance
frameworks more pronounced and effective. Economic
institutions, such as the International Money Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank, will be revamped, made
less relevant, or supplanted by non-Western ones.
Following Brexit and potential Grexit amid the
rising tide of populism, protectionalism, and strained
economic policymaking of its members, the EU will
face two outcomes—be redone or undone. Global security frameworks, especially the United Nations (UN),
will remain weak. Alliances will be hard to come by
due to the situational nature of interactions. If it survives, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
will remain the most successful alliance, likely boasting new members and pursuing new missions. But
its members will have to provide more funding and
commitment, given fiscal constraints and feared isolationism of its largest contributor—the United States.
Moreover, NATO members increasingly will seek
deeper ties with select nonmembers, given the situational nature of global interactions.
Complexity, speed, and intensity (CSI) will define
the global operational threat environment and strategic landscape in the coming decades. The international
system will become more unpredictable, exposed to
“circular causality”6 featuring more wild cards7 than
in the previous century, despite technologies that will
help us create better risk management systems against
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their own effects. Significant and rapid changes across
interconnected technological, economic, and social
domains will usher in the Era of Multiple Transformations.8 Understanding this era and its complexity will differentiate a good forecast from a bad one.
Already back in 1933, Professor A. M. Low suggested that Britain have a Minister for the Future:
It will be the duty of the Minister to collect data from all over
the world, to tabulate, correlate, compare and calculate. He
will be like a spider sitting in a Web, drawing towards him
all knowledge, and working out, on scientific lines, the effect
that the latest developments and discoveries will have.9

All actors will need this role for the 21st century,
given the growing number of developments across
centuries.10
The U.S. military should be flexible in such a
fast-changing operational threat environment and strategic landscape, and should have the political backing
to harness related dynamics to face and exploit them.
It should identify early on and be prepared to navigate
the above megatrends, assess the related impact on its
interests and capabilities, and design policies enhancing its strategic edge. It should also consider the potential wild cards and prepare for related contingencies.
As it pursues these goals, it should retain and cultivate
new allies, secure new basing and logistical arrangements, define new strategic and tactical objectives, and
streamline processes, as well as identify, develop, and
leverage new technologies to enhance logistics and
military operations.
Not a deterministic enterprise, this monograph
aims to help the effort by exploring and preparing
for the possible and the probable in the transformed
world of 2050. It relies on elements of forecasting,
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scenarios, and wild cards, seeking not to predict but
to envision the evolution and outcomes of the megatrends impacting the operational threat environment
and strategic landscape for the U.S. military. It uses
linear and nonlinear analysis to plot trajectories and
assess implications and possibilities. In doing so, it
seeks a position in the middle of the spectrum defined
by determinism on the one extreme and free will on
the other. It also takes a holistic perspective to produce
a more informed analysis, employing deduction and
induction to decode and encode linkages between and
among the trends, impacts, and the resulting strategic
landscape. Finally, the monograph points to increased
CSI of developments across geographic and functional
areas, forcing it to rely on relative simplicity to deal
with absolute complexity.
MEGATRENDS AND THE GLOBAL
OPERATIONAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT
There is no national science, just as there is no national
multiplication table.11
							
— Anton Chekhov
There are known knowns and known unknowns, but
what we should be worried about most is the unknown
unknowns.12
							

— Gary Marcus

Demographic Dividends and Liabilities
Future State
Six major trends will define the demographic conditions by 2050, when the global population will reach
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nine billion before declining thereafter: (1) the slowing
or reversing population growth in the industrialized
states; (2) the concentration of large and youthful populations in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia;
(3) the rapid aging in North America, Europe, and East
Asia; (4) substantially increased migration flows; (5)
the growing urbanization, especially in China, India,
and parts of Africa; and (5) the population growth in
poor countries susceptible to climate change.13
Slowing and reversing population growth in the
industrialized world. More than 86 percent of the
global population will live in the developing world
by 2050, as industrialized countries will continue to
exhibit falling birth rates.14 Asia will remain the most
populous, with more than half the planet living there.
Africa will account for half of the projected 2.3 billion
increase in the global population, equivalent to populations of 3 Europes. Eastern Europe and western parts
of Europe will see little difference in their population
levels.15 This trend is in line with a global demographic
transition, whereby Asia and Africa become a greater
source of the global population growth during this century due to medical advances and falling death rates,
as opposed to Europe and North America with their
significant declines in fertility rates.16 There are exceptions, though, as some African and Latin American
countries are projected to exhibit rapidly falling fertility rates. Japan, most of Europe, Russia, and former
Soviet states will have populations below replacement
levels.17 The United States will retain one of the largest
populations until 2050, due to relatively higher birth
rates and immigration.18
Concentration of large and young populations
in the industrializing world. Nine out of 10 children
under 15 will grow up in the developing world.19 A lot
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of the projected increase in the global population will
occur in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia,
while 70 percent will occur in low-income countries,
such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Ethiopia, and Nigeria.20 The populations of
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen
will double, growing by 280 million total.21 Somalia,
Afghanistan, Yemen, the West Bank and Gaza, Ethiopia, and much of sub-Saharan Africa will have especially high fertility rates.22 Meanwhile, dependency
ratios will continue declining in India, sub-Saharan
Africa, and select countries in the Middle East and
North Africa, featuring the median age of less than
40 and serving as a source of larger and cheaper labor
force.23 Turkey, Iran, Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia will have youthful populations.24 If harnessed
effectively, the demographic potential of these countries might be a source of dynamic economic growth.25
The rapid aging of the old and new worlds. By
2050, one-third of the developed world’s population
will be more than 60 years old. Most developed countries will see a 50 percent increase in their populations
aged more than 60, comprising 35 to 45 percent of the
population in Europe, Japan, and South Korea; and
16 percent and 30 percent in the United States and
Canada, respectively.26 South Korea, Japan, and most
European countries are projected to see their prime
labor force dwindle by anywhere from 25 to 33 percent, and China by 17 percent. China’s median age of
about 35 will increase to 49, India’s population aged
60 to 80 will increase 326 percent, and Brazil’s elderly
population will grow from the current 7 percent to 25
percent by 2050.27 Iran, Singapore, and Korea will see
their dependency ratios increase four times; those of
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China, Mexico, Brazil, Cuba, Turkey, Algeria, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia by three
times.28 The aging trend will encourage much larger
labor participation by women, especially in the Middle
East and Southeast Asia.29 At the same time, medical
advances could increase lifespans significantly, contributing to the overall aging trend worldwide.30
Increased internal and external migration flows.
More than 230 million migrants will roam the earth
by 2050.31 These migrant flows will occur within and
between countries, with the old and the newly developed countries attracting an ever-larger portion of
migrants from the developing world. Income inequalities, conflicts, ethnic and religious tensions, as well as
more directly manifesting environmental stresses will
increase “the number of people on the move.”32 Some
flows will benefit countries in the migration chain, providing them with badly needed sources of economic
growth. Others will strain or, in select cases, overwhelm the governance and economic systems, possibly leading to unrest or conflict.
Increasing urbanization. The share of the global
urban population will increase from 42.7 percent in
2005 to almost 70 percent by 2050—roughly a 50 percent increase, or the size of the global population in
2005. This would require an 11-fold increase in consumption requirements—a level equivalent to the
population growth from 7 to 72 billion.33 City residents
will comprise 85 percent of the population in the more
developed world and 65 percent in the less developed
world.34 The less-developed world will add 3 billion
urban residents, more than twice as it had in 2005.35
The pace of urbanization has already been so rapid
that the world has seen an annual addition of seven
New York cities over the last four decades.36 Growing

12

urbanization will especially apply to China, India, and
Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa will feature fast-growing
cities, where slums and inequality will threaten already
weak governance and economic systems. Urban air
pollution, exclusion from health care, and poor housing conditions and their communicable diseases will
define urban landscapes, with especially deleterious
effects on rural migrant populations looking for work
in megacities.37
Concentration of population growth in poorer
countries susceptible to climate change. Select countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia will
see concentrated population growth. Many will have
fragile governance systems, struggling to absorb the
projected population growth.38 Africa will be almost 3
times the size of Europe, accounting for about half of the
2.3 billion increase in the global population.39 Many of
the sub-Saharan countries will experience major development challenges. Because many cities will be located
near the coast, the risks and impact of sea level rise and
flooding will grow considerably. Population growth
in Pakistan and Nigeria will pressure the Sahel, the
waters of Niger, and the Indus valley. To illustrate, the
water table in Punjab, Pakistan’s major farming area,
is disappearing rapidly due to the local population
growth (Pakistan’s population is projected to rise from
175 million in 2010 to 275 million by 2050, according to
some estimates). This will likely trigger resources conflicts due to migration and refugee flows pressuring
the already strained support systems. While a larger
population might not be associated with more violence
as before,40 the scale and pace of population growth
and income disparities will cause counter-pressures.41
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Implications for the Global Operational Threat
Environment and the U.S. Military
As the population growth in industrialized countries slows, NATO members will find it harder to
recruit and field their armed forces and, by implication,
initiate, sustain, and complete operations overseas.42
Meanwhile, large developing states will upgrade their
military capabilities significantly, drawing on larger
populations and increased economic potential. Militaries increasingly will compete with industrial sectors for
labor. Not to be outdone, the industrialized states and
select large developing states will rely on technological solutions to deal with their shallower labor pools.
Military sectors of these states thus will see a more
profound transition, whereby capital in the form of
technology will substitute labor on a much larger scale
and in a pattern similar to the economic transition centuries ago when technology started widely replacing
labor in industrial sectors. As they do, they will rely on
autonomous technologies, the participation of women
in full combat roles, and lenient immigration policies
to staff their armed forces.43
Meanwhile, managing national or regional orders
will become very costly, especially in the case of crises
in countries with weaker governments, poor economies, and large young populations. Imagine managing conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in a
decade’s time! Iraq’s population is projected to grow
from approximately 31 to 44 million, Afghanistan’s
from 28 to 45 million, and Pakistan’s from 181 to 246
million.44 Burdened by financial and demographic
stresses of its own, the United States increasingly will
turn to allies to manage regional crises and orders—a
task that will be difficult to pursue for the allies who
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will face even more severe challenges associated with
their demographic conditions and potentially slower
growing economies. To put things in perspective,
Germany’s population aged 15-24 will decline by
one-fourth in the next 20 years, Japan’s by one-fifth.
The United States and its allies will need to restructure international institutions to advance stability and
prevent or mitigate regional economic and security
crises.45
The combination of rapid development, urbanization, and population growth in fragile states will contribute to or cause systemic and non-systemic disorders
in the form of conflicts or more frequent and largescale terrorist attacks affecting urban infrastructures.
Cities will become more frequent targets for large-scale
attacks, making the 2008 Mumbai attacks pale in comparison.46 As security risks increasingly impact cities,
the divisions between “soldiers and civilians, combatants and criminals” will become fuzzy. The protection
of urban populations will assume a prominent role,
with success of government responses depending on
the pace, scale, and particularities of local urbanization
trends.47 Authorities increasingly will rely on the collaboration between domestic and external security and
military agencies to protect cities.48
Aging trends and population increase will contribute to more lasting labor pools and potentially
less violent societies. But youth bulges in countries
with poor governance and economies will cause economic stresses, likely leading to unrest or conflicts.
Meanwhile, the substantial increase in migrant flows
amid the rapid urbanization will increase related
risks.49 Moreover, an intercontinental biological attack
or spread of diseases may reverse the trend in a way
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similar to the Black Death, which claimed about a third
of Europe’s population between 1347 and 1351.50
Recommendations for the U.S. Department of Defense,
Department of State, and the Military
• Strengthen existing and develop new alliances
for peacekeeping and crises management operations tailored for fragile states with youth
bulges. Focus on Brazil, China, India, Mexico,
and Turkey as partners—relatively large economies with large militaries positioned in key
regions and more capable of undertaking larger
missions.
• Enhance existing and create new coordination
mechanisms involving domestic and external
security and military agencies regarding the
management of urban threats.
• Identify countries that could serve as sources of
soldier recruits in the future and develop targeted campaigns across the immigration, foreign, and military policy spectrums.
• Develop and integrate technologies that could
substitute labor within the armed forces on a
much larger scale, but with safeguards in place
so as not to undermine command and control.
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Wild Card: Raging Youth Bulges of the Greater Middle
East
The world of 2050 is one of an aged and pacified old core, represented by North America,
Europe, and parts of East Asia, and one of a young
and restless greater Middle East, represented by
still poor Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia,
and Yemen whose populations double in size, as
projected. Still reeling from instability as a result
of previous wars and regional conflicts, these
countries fail to take advantage of their demographic dividend to boost economic growth and
development. The demographic liability presented by their youth bulges instead turns them
into a source of significant instability, as the
unemployed and restless youth take to the streets
en masse. The deprived coordinate their anti-government actions using proliferating social media
and information communication technologies,
which accentuate the intra- and international
income and wealth disparities. Mass protests
eventually unseat the powers-that-be, causing a
systemic collapse of the already ineffective and,
in some cases, failing institutions, and leading
to protracted civil wars that increasingly suck
in outside powers. Pacification strategies—from
within or without—fail to contain the situation.
The countries now become full-fledged hotbeds
of terrorist networks, with those in Pakistan on
the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons. The
youth bulges now inflame the greater region and
grab non-stop headlines, with internal and external forces failing to tame them.
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Environmental Risks and Breakthroughs
Future State
Resource consumption and depletion, climate
change effects, and water scarcity challenges will
become much more pronounced, rapid, and large-scale,
affecting many more people worldwide by 2050. Environmental stresses will be much more severe due to
human activity. But the tipping point will be avoided,
in large part because of technological, and resource
and environmental management advances that will
prevent new and mitigate existing deleterious impacts
of climate change.51 Yet, the progress will be uneven,
with some regions being more prone to conflict.
Rapid resource consumption and depletion.
The pace of resources consumption and depletion is
already very rapid, large-scale, and in some cases
alarming. An average Westerner, for instance, consumes more within 2 years than an average Kenyan
in his entire life. Of the seven billion global population, only one-seventh enjoys such consumption rate.52
However, the projected population and consumption growth in the already environmentally stressed
areas will strain resource systems considerably. Food,
resources, and fresh water requirements alone are projected to almost double by 2050.53 More than a third of
the Earth’s soil, producing 95 percent of food supply,
is already degraded.54
Meanwhile, known oil reserves are on track for
depletion by 2050, requiring the world of 2030 as many
as 9 agreeable Saudi Arabias to meet the demand of
106 million barrels of oil per day. While resources and
food will be available to make the fight against hunger
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easier, the resource distribution and consumption patterns will still be uneven. Infrastructure issues, environmental concerns, and geopolitics will stand in the
way. As for oil, opportunities will emerge to develop
new fields in the Caucasus and Africa,55 while projected technological advancements might lead to a
more hydrogen-based and renewables-fueled global
economy.56
Climate change. Changes in climate patterns,
largely attributed to increased levels of atmospheric
carbon dioxide due to fossil fuels use, will become
more apparent in the coming decades, as population
and consumption levels rise. The global population
growth, nearly all of it in the developing world and
mostly in water-stressed areas, will strain the environment, causing more severe climate change-induced
natural disasters and conflicts.57 The UN projects outdoor air pollution to be the top cause of environmentally related deaths globally by 2035, when half of the
world’s population will also face water shortages.58
The floods, droughts, and intense heat waves of the
last few decades have already resulted in approximately 300,000 deaths annually.59
By 2050, humans will have all corners of the world
under their control, with the exception of parts of
Antarctica; the northern forests and tundra; the rainforest cores of the Congo and Amazon basins; and
select deserts of Africa, Australia, and Tibet.60 Expect
more desertification and changes to rainfall distribution within the monsoon belt of the Arabian Sea and
South Asia, higher frequency and intensity of extreme
weather events with a potentially severe impact on
low-lying coastal regions, more rapid glacier melting in Central Asia and the Himalayas, and disputes
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involving Central and South Asian states stemming
from the environmental changes.61
As urbanization increases and climate change
becomes more apparent, expect a major increase in sea
levels, storm surges, and inland flooding—all affecting coastal cities more profoundly. More than 6 billion
people already live in urban areas, most of these near
the coasts.62
By 2035, roughly 50 percent more people than in
the year 2000 will live in low-elevation coastal zones
worldwide, with the number in Asia increasing by
more than 150 million and Africa increasing by 60 million. Many megacities, such as Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh
City, Jakarta, and Manila, will continue to sink because
of excessive groundwater extraction and natural geologic activity.63
The United States already suffers from annual
flood damages, which will worsen unless countermeasures are in place—something most U.S. cities should
be able to pull off. But other world regions will not
boast the same readiness and will contend with more
severe impacts, requiring international efforts and
approaches to deal with flood prevention and relief
operations.64 The World Bank estimates that addressing climate change will cost USD$400 billion by 2050.
This is when the global GDP may reach USD$280 trillion—surely enough if countries commit to the task.65
Water scarcity. Water scarcity will emerge a major
challenge by the mid-century. Demand for water will
rise drastically due to population growth. Access to
fresh water sources will become more limited due to climate change. Conflict will become more likely between
upstream and downstream countries absent resolution
mechanisms and water-sharing agreements.66 Up to 4
billion people will face water shortages and reduced
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agricultural production, primarily in Africa, the
Middle East, South Asia, and northern China.67 This is
when only 3 percent of the surface’s water constitutes
fresh water, with 2 percent concentrated in ice caps
and glaciers, and 1 percent directly accessible.68
The projected population and resource consumption growth mean that two out of three people might
live in water-stressed conditions by 2030. To compare,
the global population tripled and the use of water
increased six times in the 20th century; by 2030, the
demand for water will increase by 40 times.69 More
than 30 countries, of which almost half are in the
Middle East, brace for extreme high water stress by
2035.70 Parts of Africa, Australia, the Middle East, and
North America are already consuming more water
than nature can replenish, while water pollution, mismanagement, and inequitable distribution exacerbate
the challenge.71 China, for instance, is planning 59 new
reservoirs in Xingjian to retain water from glacier-fed
rivers, while the United States announced USD$1 billion in new water projects across its western regions.72
Implications for the Global Operational Threat Environment and the U.S. Military
Climate change-induced risks will include hurricanes, storms, ozone layer damage, ocean acidification,
and rising sea levels, with conflicts over water, land,
and food resources becoming more frequent and linked
more directly to climate change.73 Floods, droughts,
cyclones, and hurricanes have already caused more
damage to millions of people in the last decade than in
the same period of the late 20th century. Expect those
numbers to increase significantly, especially in poorly
governed countries. Floods in Pakistan, for instance,
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affected 20 million people in 2011, while the increasing
variability of rain in parts of Africa caused localized
conflicts and refugee flows. Climate change-induced
refugee flows will swell the ranks of the already outsized global demographic waves and add to the tens of
millions displaced worldwide.74
Yet, it is the projected rise in sea levels by one meter
by the end of the century that will present an especially
serious challenge. The coastlines of the Indian Ocean,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and southern China are
all increasingly at risk of major flooding and population displacement, which will strain or overwhelm
local support systems. Thus, climate change and risk
management frameworks increasingly will assume a
central stage in global politics, while shelter, communication, transport, and medicine will play an even
larger role as mitigating factors.75 But interstate tensions over managing climate change should not be
ruled out, especially in the case of geoengineering
technologies that can also be used as a weapon to affect
climate conditions.76
The combination of the security risks associated with or caused by climate change and the projected population growth will strain civilian and
military capabilities of countries.77 The military forces
of the United States and its allies increasingly will be
involved in humanitarian operations overseas to help
with environmental devastation, conflict prevention,
or rebuilding of collapsed environmental systems to
contain their distribution and to pursue geopolitical
objectives.78
Meanwhile, oil will retain its appeal as a magnet
of foreign intervention.79 But its significance as a strategic resource will decline, as other sources of energy
will be utilized on a wide scale. However, the need
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for uninterrupted access to other strategic resources,
such as rare earth minerals, will prompt interventions. These minerals are concentered in few parts
of the world, and only a handful of countries control
their production and export. Demand for them in the
technologically developed yet resource-strained world
of 2050 will increase drastically, making them much
more strategic, and interventions aimed at securing
them likely and frequent.
Another strategic resource likely to invite intervention or cause resource wars is water. Fortunately
for water-stressed regions, the expanded virtual water
trade flows will help them address water scarcity.
Many countries in Europe, the Middle East, North
Africa, Japan, and Mexico are already major net water
importers, with the global virtual water trade representing about 40 percent of all human water consumption.80 For instance, water independence ended
in Israel, Jordan, and Egypt in the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s, respectively. But these countries have relied on
technology and virtual trade to avoid water conflicts.
Not all states will have adequate mechanisms to obtain,
sustain, and expand their reliance on the virtual water
trade, exposing themselves to potential conflict.
By 2050, most water-stressed areas will remain
the same, even if they will face bigger water scarcity
challenges, such areas include: the Mediterranean,
southwestern North America, Africa, the Middle
East, Central Asia and India, northern China, Australia, Chile, and eastern Brazil. Even the disappearance
of the Jordan River and the Fertile Crescent is in the
cards. Meanwhile, the Nile, Jordan, Tigris-Euphrates,
and Indus river basins will likely trigger water tensions or conflicts between rival nations with a history
of interstate wars. Populations that depend on these
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river basins will grow from 70 to 150 percent by 2050,
with water demand exceeding water supply levels and
impacting conflict trends in North Africa, the Middle
East, and South Asia.81
Recommendations for the U.S. Department of Defense,
Department of State, and the Military
• Identify areas with the highest potential for
partial or full systemic collapse due to environmentally induced security risks, stresses,
and conflicts, and formulate related military
responses involving the participation of host
nations and other actors.
• Develop and propagate the use of climate
change risk management frameworks featuring
a more expanded involvement of military forces
and military-civilian partnerships.
• Define more clearly the legal and operational
roles of the U.S. military in responding to
humanitarian disasters caused by environmental factors, domestically and globally.
• Advance climate change-related security and
military cooperation frameworks.
• Identify areas of strategic resources and related
dependencies likely to emerge by 2050 and
develop operational scenarios for overseas
involvement in securing access to such resources
in the case of supply interruptions due to conflicts, interventions, or sabotage.
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Wild Card: Flooded Coastlines, Submerged Cities
The world is severely water-stressed by 2050.
But coastlines have more than plenty of water.
Floods due to the rise in sea levels are now more
frequent and large-scale, impacting hundreds of
thousands of people in the rural and urban areas
scattered along the sprawling coastlines of major
regions. The now globally accepted and expected
risk of localized flooding suddenly turns into a
nightmare of severe magnitude when a tsunami
of unprecedented force in the Asia-Pacific engulfs
a host of coastal megacities in Indonesia and the
Philippines. The catastrophe overwhelms national
disaster response frameworks, destroying entire
economic systems of urban environments and causing extraordinarily high numbers of deaths, population displacements, and migrant flows. Inland cities
of both countries become recipients of staggering
flows of displaced migrants, straining some and
overwhelming other local socio-economic infrastructure and support networks. Countries worldwide rush to provide humanitarian aid and commit
reconstruction efforts. Military personnel of outside
powers are now seen as a welcome presence. The
global support notwithstanding, the damage to the
economies and environment is so severe that the
reconstruction of some areas is no longer feasible,
while the rebuilding of other ones will require a
generation-long commitment by the now bankrupt,
overburdened, and exhausted governments. The
deluge serves as a wake-up call, with the military
and civilian agencies of countries worldwide committing to substantially enhanced climate change
mitigation measures and disaster relief and humanitarian response agreements and mechanisms.
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Uneven Socio-Economic and Political Transitions
Future State
The following socio-economic and political trends
will define the strategic landscape in the coming
decades: the rebalancing of the global order and power
hierarchy marking the advance of Asian powers in
the pecking order; the accelerating global economic
convergence, as well as faster modernization and
democratization impeded by economic regionalization and political centralization; and the “reweaving”
of a global energy fabric reflecting a much wider and
extensive use of renewables in the industrialized and,
increasingly, industrializing societies.
Reshuffling of global order and power hierarchy.
The growing economic and military capabilities of
non-Western powers will define the ongoing rebalancing of the global order. Systemic changes in the form
of state disintegration (Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq)
or territorial state expansion (Russia plus Crimea)
will still be a part of the process.82 But a recalibrated
global order will be the most notable change. While the
United States and its select Western allies will possess
the strongest, most efficient, competent, technologically enhanced, and globally deployable forces, their
relative economic and military capabilities and influence will decline drastically. Many more other powers
will inch closer to the status of kings.
Asian countries, especially India and China, will
occupy the front seats across most negotiation tables.
The United States, the EU, and Japan are on track to
produce 60 percent of the global GDP by 2030, but
Asia will account for 50 percent of the global GDP.
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China and India will become the world’s largest economies—a status both enjoyed in prior centuries. Goldman Sachs, for instance, projects that China’s GDP will
reach USD$70 trillion—80 percent more than the U.S.
economy, projected to be the only G-7 economy by size
(China, the United States, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and Mexico).83
No single power will be as dominant in all areas
as the United States had been during its 20 year-long
unipolar moment after the Soviet Union collapsed;84
certainly not across all domains simultaneously,
although the United States and China will come closer
than any other power. In a three- or four-tiered influence structure, the United States and its Western allies
will still represent the first position, given their predominant military capabilities. China and India—with
their already substantial and capable military arsenals
and immense economic sway—will represent a close
second. Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and
Mexico will represent the third, followed by major
corporations, of which technology-focused ones will
dominate the global economic landscape.
Depending on their relative weight, all these actors
will be influencing major trends and outcomes differently. New sets of relations and institutions will emerge
across traditional and increasingly new sectors, such
as the cyber, space, robotics, nano- and biotechnology,
among other areas. Institutions and regimes, such as
the EU, NATO, the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),
will either disintegrate or be forced to adapt to the new
demands and conditions.85
The U.S. grand strategic goal of advancing global
connectivity as a pillar of national security will remain
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the same. Retired Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski
put it best:
Security is our nation’s largest single public sector export,
and it’s booming . . . If you are fighting globalization, if
you reject the rules, if you reject connectivity, you are
probably going to be of interest to the United States
Department of Defense.86

But this is where it gets complicated. China and
India will favor the global connectivity, which has
already made them wealthier. Yet, they will want the
process to unfold on their terms or with them at the
table as full-fledged co-managers of this connectivity.
Provided current dynamics hold, the United States
might benefit from having the two powers as co-managers of the global order in return for their acceptance
of the common rules.
As these and other countries become wealthier, they increasingly will shape new narratives, discourses, and tastes for global consumption, sidelining
Western discourses and offering other ways of looking
at and shaping an individual and social life.87 Western development models will still be attractive, even
to China and India or their select elites. Along with
rapidly proliferating information technologies, they
will even promote political modernization and democratization worldwide. Yet, a potential success of China’s and India’s development models might tilt the
scales and advance development concepts that do not
reflect Western values, either fully or partially.88 In this
case, a lot will depend not just on the success of other
models, but also on the ability of Western countries to
address their own numerous economic and political
imperfections.
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Economic and political convergence and divergence. The world of 2050 will still feature developing
countries, at times stagnant and failing, despite all
the projected accumulation of wealth by old and new
club members. Almost 70 percent of 5.3 billion workers, many representing global consumers, will live in
emerging economies.89 Yet, many more countries will
leap forward in terms of development, as the global
economic convergence accelerates. North American and Western Europe’s share of real GDP will fall
from 40 percent in 2010 to 21 percent in 2050. Asia’s
will double. China’s will rise from 13.6 percent in 2010
to 20 percent. The fastest-growing regions per capita
GDP will be Asia (4.7 percent), sub-Saharan Africa (4.4
percent), the Middle East and North Africa (3 percent),
Latin America (3.3 percent), and Eastern Europe (3.2
percent). Western countries will grow slower unless
they harness new discoveries and revolutions—a
quite likely scenario. China and India will grow faster,
though their growth will decline as they move up the
value chain. They will also remain poorer than many
Western countries on a per capita basis.90
Current income disparities will stabilize or narrow
significantly, as more countries will have reached standards of living comparable to, equal to, or exceeding
those of the developed world today. But the perception
of inequality will remain, and might even intensify, as
the ICTs and enhanced global interaction will make
the awareness of inequality more obvious. (Pointedly,
companies are developing virtual “empathy engines”
as a way to mitigate the perception of inequality.91)
Meanwhile, more countries, especially in Africa and
Asia, will be urbanizing rapidly during the economic
transition, causing wider intrastate inequality.92 Middle-skill occupations will be disappearing in the
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developed and, increasingly, the developing world.
The professions prioritizing information, knowledge,
and technology will proliferate.93 Countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America, for instance, are
already seeking to expand their services and knowledge economic sectors. As far as the agricultural sector,
a potential spread of animal and plant diseases and
emerging shift in agricultural patterns could disrupt
global and local food production chains. But advances
in irrigation and crop strains will boost agricultural
production efficiency,94 alleviating the socio-economic
dislocations.
As they develop their knowledge and services economies, the developing countries of today will become
major sources of innovation for tomorrow across a
variety of fields, in select cases inching closer to the
status of Western countries. The Western world will
still occupy a leading position, but it will no longer be
dominant, certainly not across all innovation areas.95
The United States, Germany, Canada, South Korea,
Japan, Australia, and Israel will master the entire
spectrum of the innovation cycle. A rank down, but
with a potential to move up rapidly, will be China,
India, Russia, and Poland, which will master most key
technological areas. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Turkey, Indonesia, and South Africa will follow third.
Egypt, Kenya, Cameroon, Chad, Nepal, the Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Iran, Jordan, and Georgia will
occupy the fourth tier.96 China’s high-tech products
already account for 22 percent of global exports, and
its share will only grow to overtake the total share
of Western countries unless the latter make qualitative breakthroughs. Meanwhile, technology proliferation will shrink the technological development gap
as the global economy recalibrates to become more
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knowledge-based, marked by wider information flows
and their integration for development purposes.97
Yet, the development and proliferation of new
technologies and economic linkages behind the global
economic convergence will confront the forces of
nationalism, protectionism, economic regionalization
and localization. The latter will intensify because of
more frictions in the rebalancing global economy. After
all, globalization has lifted millions out of poverty, but
it has also increased competition and fueled anti-establishment, populist sentiment in both the developed and
developing countries. Meanwhile, the projected proliferation of independent manufacturers serving global
markets due to 3-D and 4-D printing and related technologies will disrupt trade flows in what might be the
biggest revolution in manufacturing since mass production.98 (Of course, 3-D and 4-D manufacturers will
still need access to raw materials, property rights, and
global markets.99) Trade and economic projects, such as
the EU, Association of South East Asian Nations, and
the Commonwealth of Independent States, will in turn
need to change to survive or face collapse. Others, such
as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (or its version given
the Trump administration’s U-turn on the issue), One
Belt, One Road, or the proposed Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership might flourish if pursued
right.100 But regionalization and localization forces will
surely hold them back.
The global economic convergence fueled by the
ICTs and the Internet will advance the democratization
and openness of the political and economic systems.
But this will not bring the end of the world, Fukuyamastyle. Authoritarian states will still be with us, and the
democratic ones will deal with their own authoritarian impulses under global economic pressures and
constrained economic opportunities at home. Indeed,
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while the general trend will likely be one of wider and
deeper democratization globally, select countries—
including current democracies—will see their related
prospects diminished or doomed.101
Populism and protectionism will undermine liberalism and free market principles, while strong
nationalism in some countries will intensify interstate
frictions in the geo-economic and geopolitical arenas.
This would especially be the case as the developing
countries catch up with the developed ones and take
their share of global markets. Populism is on the rise
in the United States, Europe (France, Greece, and the
Netherlands), and Asia (the Philippines and Thailand),
while “political decay” is no longer a far-fetched characterization of the political system in the United States.
Notably, the number of states with elements of
authoritarian systems is growing,102 though it could
represent a transition stage whereby democratic systems try to cope with increased demands for more
effective governance due to globalization, urbanization, and climate change. On balance, more countries
are likely to move toward more transparent, accountable, and democratic systems, with less citizenry and
heavy-handed deals with poor government performers. This would be welcome news for those trying to
quell religious conflicts, extremism, and terrorism.
Reshaping of the global energy fabric. The global
population and economic growth will require 75 percent more energy by 2050,103 likely to be available but
subject to technological advances on the acceleration
side and environmental concerns on the deceleration
side.104 A post-industrial energy fabric will start emerging in the advanced economies, based on a much wider
and extensive use of alternative energy sources and
technologies, decentralization of energy sources and
consumers, and efficient use of energy systems. This
32

will reshape the global and regional energy flows once
dominated by fossil fuels, contributing to an unprecedented global economic transition for the world.105
Biomass consumption now contributes less than
1 percent to the global electricity production, but it is
projected to grow by 50 to 300 percent. Biofuels might
provide about a quarter of all liquid transport fuels.
Hydrogen may serve as an alternative to oil and gas,
meeting 35 percent of energy needs by 2035 alone and
heralding “a full-blown hydrogen economy.”106 The
shares of wind, solar, and hydro will grow considerably, making them viable choices for development.
Global energy costs will face downward pressures,
making the global energy system more resilient.107
But the uneven access to energy resources and variable consumption patterns will persist.108 Technologically advanced societies will make renewables a larger
share of their energy systems due to environmental
concerns, likely at the expense of higher economic
growth rates, at least until the new energy sectors generate economies of scale.109 Fortunately, new energy
technologies and more salient environmental concerns
will spread far and wide.110 The tech economies of the
West and Asia will do the heavy lifting here, benefiting the developing world exponentially rather than
incrementally, as had been the case in the previous
century. With time, the technological advances and a
larger “renewable source potential” in the developing
world will facilitate a more dramatic expansion of the
local renewables markets compared to the developed
world.111 As the global energy fabric is rewoven, the
developing countries will be able to “electrify” their
economies rapidly and increase the speed of renewables’ deployment.112
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Implications for the Global Operational Threat Environment and the U.S. Military
The past half-century has seen a significant reduction in the rate of battle deaths in wars of all kinds,
linked as it has been to increased development and
economic linkages, among other factors.113 The emerging global economic convergence, while not a panacea, will continue to reduce the prospects of interstate
wars and the war death rates in the coming decades.
Economic growth will not be as much about supporting military spending—a goal that used to orient the
economic activity in previous centuries.114 Instead, it
will be more about competition in the economic arena,
increasingly across new sectors. Though not without
a struggle, states of all stripes and colors already are
building tech-based economies.115 A new global energy
landscape is emerging, one that is being born in conflict and peace as dependencies in terms of access to
resources, technologies, supply links, and markets
break, and form anew.
In such a world, expect a shift to a more functional
approach to interstate ties and national strategic planning. Systems and subsystems of relations will still
be important building blocks. The construction and
management of regional orders will still be important,
though increasingly harder for the United States and
its allies, as more capable regional managers emerge:116
China in Asia and Central Asia, India in South Asia,
Brazil in South America, and Iran and Turkey in the
Middle East. Meanwhile, the new managers also will
contend with the growing influence of other actors.
But the development and proliferation of new technologies and sectors, as well as the growing importance of select resources and potentially accelerating
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(re)evolution of cyber and space technologies and
operations, will create new functional dependences.
This will elevate the importance and reliance on the
functional approach to strategic planning, especially as
the global economy converges and national capabilities tend to equalize in the coming decades.
With more factors and increased CSI of developments at play, the prospects for an effective policy planning look dim, despite the shift to a functional view of
strategic planning that only select powers will harness.
No clear compass, or the organizing principle, of planning will emerge. As the Princeton Project on National
Security concluded, “containment, enlargement, balancing or democracy promotion” in this century is not
a viable organizing principle for strategic planning
due to multiple threats.117 This complicates the already
fractured U.S. strategic planning process, suffering
from turf wars, time constraints, and tensions between
“thinkers” and “doers.”118 On balance, the U.S. military
will have a diminished ability to navigate the global
operational threat environment, and to address the
increased number of threats to U.S. national security.
But “crisis, change, and uncertainty” will offer an
opportunity for strategic planning, prompting the
development of more sophisticated planning tools in
the future.119 Moreover, the United States will still be
the only state capable of shaping most extensively the
global order in military terms.120 Even if other states
were an inch closer to that capacity by 2050, the United
States would have an earlier start to self-organize. This
is crucial, given the pace and scale of transitions in the
coming decades and the importance of forward-looking adaptation for the United States and its “military
machine.” That adaptation will entail an expanded
reliance on the civilian capacity,121 integrated within
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the military and/or working alongside it. It will also
entail a shift of the burden to allies to manage regional
orders.122 The changing nature of war and rules of war,
in turn, will require new military and legal regimes to
shape related norms, practices, and institutions.123 This
will be key, as broader and deeper democratization
highlights the need for more individual and national
accountability, transparency, and higher intolerance
for casualties, however seemingly minor.
Recommendations for the U.S. Department of Defense,
Department of State, and the Military
• Create an interagency strategic planning unit,
including directors and deputy assistants from
the Department of Defense (DoD), Joint Chiefs
of Staff, National Intelligence Council, and the
Treasury, emphasizing functional dimensions
during the strategic planning and execution.
• Increase funding for policy research/development related to issues of strategic planning.
• Strengthen the civilian policy component within
and outside the purview of the military focused
on the security, diplomacy, development, and
civilian-military partnerships.
• Design and propagate military and legal
regimes shaping norms, practices, and institutions related to the evolving definitions and
practice of war and rules of war.
• Accelerate the shift to the development and use
of renewable energy sources and technologies
within the military, enhancing mission efficiency and autonomy.
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Wild Card—The Death of China’s Experiment
In the world of 2050, China is king. Increasingly, the
entire global economy, and not just the immediate regional
suburbs, are spinning around it, attracted by its outsized consumption glut and using renminbi as the global and, importantly, preferred choice of currency. Everything revolves
around China: from politics and economics to culture and
entertainment. But the Middle Kingdom suddenly experiences a fall from grace once again. Only this time, the death
comes from internal rather than external pressures. China’s
political decay and inability to ensure a smooth transition to
the world of more democratic politics comes to coalesce with
a similarly rotten financial and economic system, overburdened by debt, supported by fake statistics, awash in corruption, and resistant to calls of the more informed citizenry
for change. If Chinese leaders of a generation ago thought
they outsmarted “The End of History” and fared better than
the Soviet Union, they are wrong: the China of 2050 fails
to save itself from the weight of its heavy military spending and broken financial system. Its development model is
dead, its communist party is disintegrated, and its economy
is shattered. Call it the death of China’s experiment! If you
think the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis or the collapse of
the Soviet Union were too grave and systemic, think again,
because the collapse of China produces ramifications of a
much larger scale and more lasting duration. While in the
19th century China’s “plague” was contained, in the global
economy of 2050 it produces truly global consequences—
ones that plunge the world’s economic system into a tailspin
to an extent far greater than we experienced with the U.S.
financial crisis. Fortunately, for China, nobody will be in the
position to carve it up old style. But the transition to a new
development model is painful, for China and the world.
Besides undermining the global economy and trade as well
as production, supply, and consumption patterns, the end of
China’s experiment ushers in the era of radical ideologies
and movements threatening to push back the “The End of
History” worldwide.
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Technological Disruptions and Solutions
Future State
ICTs, biotechnology, genetic engineering, nanomaterials and nanotechnology, robotics, and applied
cognitive science will advance in a major way in the
coming decades. A kind of a mutated technology revolution will unfold, comparable to and potentially
exceeding in its impact and scale similar to the agricultural, industrial, and information revolutions.124
Technology revolutions will unfold simultaneously
and within much shorter timeframes. Barring a global
catastrophe, humanity will be going through constantly emerging and faster transitions—a major departure from the earlier, more linear progressions. As one
author put it, imagine shopping for deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) online; taking grandkids for a space tour;
shopping entirely online; driving a hydrogen-powered
car; relying on robots at home; printing goods from
your printer; and enhancing your health and mental
capacity at a whim!125 That is just the starting point of
good and bad to come in the global technology economy, in which the pace and impact of technological
advances threaten humanity with the technological
“singularity” that could “rupture the very fabric of
human history.”126
Information and communication technologies
(ICTs). ICTs will make even more dramatic leaps,
exposing more people to more risks and benefits.
Take information storage and knowledge. Powerful
search engines continue accumulating the memory
of civilization.127 The quantity of stored information
doubles every 2 years, reaching 1.8 zettabytes in 2011
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(1 followed by 20 zeros). To put things in perspective,
it took Europe 50 years to double its knowledge base,
but a society today can pull off a 50-fold increase in
about 10 years! Information overload, not lack of it,
appears to be the challenge. Superfast computers are
already proliferating. The United States no longer
holds the monopoly on the production of superfast
computers—China does, after it showcased the fastest
supercomputer in 2010.128 Expect greater efficiencies
across the board and more surveillance opportunities;
but also more Internet fraud, identity and information
theft, cyberattacks, and intrusions,129 as the “Internet of
Things” (i.e., the linking of numerous devices) generates both efficiencies and vulnerabilities.130
Biotechnology and genetic engineering. Advances
in biotechnology and genetic engineering could potentially outdo the information revolution in both impact
and scale. Similar to computer power, DNA manipulations are getting faster.131 Enhancing the physical,
mental, and emotional capabilities of humans is within
reach. Extending people’s life and making brain manipulations is increasingly possible.132 These and other
advancements will raise ethical and religious considerations for individuals and societies,133 reshaping the
old and forming new rules and expectations. While
advancements in biotechnology and genetic engineering will remain the prerogative of wealthy societies,
the poorer ones also will enjoy the fruits of such technologies as related applications spread.
Nanomaterials and nanotechnology. Nanomaterials and nanotechnology will advance to a whole
new level—the atomic one! Both promise revolutionary changes to sectors as diverse as energy, medicine,
and transport. A new, abundant, and transformational energy source may emerge thanks to advances
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in nanotechnology.134 What is more, the intersection
of nanotechnology, biology, and cybernetics promises radical changes across numerous sectors, with the
military and civilian entities increasingly interested
in nanotechnology as a force multiplier or solution
to numerous challenges. The global nanotechnology
market in various applications already has expanded
by half in recent years and is projected to grow at a
rapid pace because of ongoing advancements.135
Developed countries will be up front when it comes
to the development and integration of nanomaterials
and nanotechnologies. But the global technology diffusion also will accelerate developing countries, some of
which may emerge as innovation leaders in the field.
That said, related advancements would raise a host of
socio-economic and environmental challenges.
Robotics and applied cognitive science. Advances
in applied cognitive science and biotechnology will
contribute to advanced robotics, linking living and
nonliving systems. Increasingly autonomous robot
systems entering and modifying different walks of life
are emerging.136 Implanting brainwave sensors and
enabling computer operations by thought will become
a widespread practice. Already, Intel is developing a
chip enabling just that. Other companies are working
on installing miniature mobile phones into people’s
heads or improving battery storage so your phones will
not die on you.137 Synergies from biology and information technologies will, in turn, make new brain scanning techniques and the construction of artificial brains
and other artificial systems a reality. Computers could
attain superhuman intelligence if computing power
grows exponentially.138 Nature, of course, will stand in
the way—the computational power of all computers
in 2010, for instance, equaled what the brain processed
only every 5 minutes.139 Self-aware systems could be
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further off than expected, but related advancements
are bringing humanity closer to the truly autonomous
systems.140 The diffusion of artificial intelligence and
automation technologies would create new and disrupt old industries, resulting in new sources of economic growth and socio-economic dislocations.
Implications for the Global Operational Threat Environment and the U.S. Military
The speed with which technologies proliferate
today has increased 10-fold over the previous century
and will continue to grow.141 Countries on the fringe of
the Information Age will witness increased information flows.142 Increased capacities of and access to technologies will bring its own risks and challenges. The
democratization of technology and digital connectivity
will allow more individuals to access more weapons
as well as utilize communication and control systems
with far greater range and precision.143 Mobile phones
and social media will become more popular and effective means of command and control on both sides of
the law.144 More automated systems and cyber technologies will make war business increasingly a homebased experience while making one’s own turf more
vulnerable. Hence, populations will be easier to attack,
while governments will be easier to blackmail.145
Boundaries between the military and civilian domains
will be blurred.146 The risk of cyber and bio attacks will
grow significantly.147 DNA warfare will be an option.148
Meanwhile, the exposed global inequality will facilitate popular mobilization, in some cases sweeping the
powers-that-be from their “gold thrones.”
Cyber operations will grow in number and scope,
influencing the will of populations and enemies,
manipulating information, and taking control of and
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destroying computer-controlled economic sectors.149
The networking and interaction between humans
and machines will impact force structure and operations. Some estimates suggest that the U.S. military
will likely need to increase its cyber forces from oneninth to about one-third to ensure its readiness and
effectiveness.150
Expanded cognitive processing power will enhance
pattern recognition, making technological systems
more autonomous. Select countries are already developing autonomous armed robotics. South Korea previously deployed two robotic snipers to lraq.151 More
countries and nonstate actors will also acquire and
use armed drones, given their cheaper costs,152 instead
of investing in bigger weapons systems, such as U.S.
F-35s.153 As of 2013, only the United States, United
Kingdom, and Israel used armed drones against enemies. But the next big users in line are China, which
is already working to expand its fleet of drones, and
the likes of Hezbollah, which employed crude drone
technology in the past.154 Fully autonomous drone
strikes may become possible, though a human likely
will remain a part of the kill chain, given cultural and
technical reasons. As drones and armed robotics proliferate, new legal requirements will arise to regulate
their use. Already, companies are developing software
for autonomous systems to ensure they adhere to the
laws of war.155
As new technologies proliferate, a scientific
and technological potential and ability to integrate
advancements in the civilian domain increasingly will
determine a country’s military strength. Competition
over scientific and technological advances in both civilian and military areas will increase significantly, pitting state and nonstate actors (including individuals)
against one another. That is bad news for the United
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States, whose share of global research and development (R&D) spending is projected to decline from
about 33 percent today to 18 percent by 2050. As other
countries invest more in R&D, the United States and its
military will find it harder to compete. The U.S. DoD’s
Science and Technology program already is struggling
to keep up with the growing pace and diminishing
costs of global defense technologies development.156
Given the importance of technological advances for
its military and economic competitiveness, losing out
in the technology arena will undermine the current
U.S. dominant technological, research, and economic
position.
Recommendations for the U.S. Department of Defense,
Department of State, and the Military
• Create and enforce global rule sets regulating
the development, use, and integration of potentially disruptive novel technologies in both
civilian and military domains.
• Develop news rules of regulating conflict, wars,
and special operations missions by factoring in
the emerging data-driven warfare and autonomous weapons systems.
• Institute a program under the DoD to monitor
the latest, emerging, and prospective technological advancements, with military applications
being pursued worldwide.
• Foster interstate, state-to-nonstate, public-private, and military-civilian partnerships to
research, develop, test, and propagate technologies with potential military applications.
• Create a network supporting an emergency
operation mode if the Internet breaks down.
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Wild Card—From Cyber Monday to Mega Blackout
The global economy of 2050 is as much virtual
as it is real. Billions of shoppers, increasingly in
emerging countries, spend trillions on goods and
services online. Entire economic sectors and economies are interconnected on an unprecedented
scale, with the Internet gluing it all into one complex organism feeding on virtual and real trade
flows. Cyber Monday is now a truly global phenomenon, 360 days a year, linking billions of producers, suppliers, and consumers. From civilians
to soldiers, this lifeline supports activities of societies and militaries alike. But hacktivists, criminals, states, and terrorist networks increasingly
exploit the generally enhanced reliance on the
Internet. An extremist group opposing a technologically enhanced world does just that by utilizing the very latest technological tools it despises
to cause a Mega Blackout of the World Wide Web.
The result? The Internet is offline. But so are
trade flows and entire economic sectors. Military
systems are no longer networked, operations are
compromised and undermined. The global economy is in ruins, not with a launch of a hydrogen
bomb but with a click of a mouse. Civilian and
military cyber warriors rush to resuscitate it. But
the damage is done—the world is disconnected,
aloof, and unrecognizable to a mid-21st century
consumer.
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Military Revolution and Counter-Revolution
Future State
Advanced militaries, and areas of future military
intervention, will get a taste of yet another military
revolution in the coming decades, which will bring
enhanced capabilities and vulnerabilities. Harnessing
it will entail the integration of and adaptation to rapid
and profound cultural, socio-economic, political, and
technological changes. Key trends in this regard will
involve a more rapid informatization and robotization
of forces and war, increased reliance on the space and
cyber domains, the refinement of the revolutionary
precision and autonomous systems, the emergence of
fundamentally new weapons systems and military tactics and doctrines, and significantly enhanced risks of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile proliferation. Meanwhile, counter-revolution will emerge
in the form of asymmetric military solutions developed
by militaries as well as ethical and legal challenges
mounted by societies worldwide.
The dawn of another military revolution. Ongoing and projected changes in military technologies,
conflict, civilian systems, and military operations and
culture herald the coming of another military revolution extending beyond this century.157 Military revolutions are products of significant social, political, and
technological changes that reshape societies, states,
individuals, and the conduct of war, making adaptation an imperative yet difficult enterprise.158 They also
take the time to emerge as they go through “innovation, diffusion, and refinement.”159 We won’t know
how it will look exactly until we do, but given the pace
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of change, this process will be much shorter. Already,
it manifests itself as part of a 4th-generation warfare
in the use of precision, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems, which will proliferate
and improve in the coming decades.160
Objectives and types of military missions will
evolve, focusing on Special and Cyber Operations
designed to achieve limited objectives rather than pursuing large-scale reconstruction of societies. That said,
culturally aware teams working alongside civilian
counterparts will become more important. The United
States and other militaries increasingly will coordinate
with home- and foreign-based civilian agencies to conduct security, stability, development, and reconstruction operations. A seized territory will be even less of
a prized possession. Borderlines between civilians and
troops will be blurred. New conflict domains—cyber,
space, and the media—will take center stage.161 Asymmetric warfare featuring cyberattacks increasingly will
be in demand.162 Collateral damage will emerge as a
major issue in a media-saturated environment. Meanwhile, enhanced precision systems will reduce casualties even more.
Information will play a much more pronounced
role in this context, explaining the U.S. military’s reliance on defense transformation to transition from a
platform to a network-centric warfare that allows for
integrated theater operations.163 The United States and
other advanced militaries are already pursuing networked operations, synchronization, and the compatibility of forces and systems. This approach will enable
a selective, precise, stealthy, collaborative, adaptable,
more lethal, and less costly application of power in
diverse theaters against a diverse set of targets.
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However, given the evolving strategic landscape,
the U.S. defense transformation will be a process, not
an outcome. After all, older weapons are getting an
upgrade, news ones are emerging, and newer ones are
yet to appear.164 The culture of armed forces, societies, and the rules of war will be changing, with “warring . . . less and less confined to the battlefield, and
more aimed at disrupting societies.” More actors will
utilize an ever-growing arsenal of tools challenging
traditional concepts of “offense/defense” and “deterrence,” increasingly along such domains as the cyber,
“electromagnetic, social media, outer space, and the
environment.”165
It will take time for the U.S. military to adapt to these
changes.166 But the end game is clear, if not assured. As
Cebrowski, the chief architect of force transformation,
put it:
We want all of our enemies, current and future to look at
us and say, ‘Wow. How do they do that? We see it unfold
before our very eyes, but we don’t understand what’s
really happening and we can’t stop it.’ That’s the power
of transformation.167

Informatization of military forces and war. The
growing informatization of armed forces and war is
a vivid manifestation of the Information Age and the
emerging military revolution. This process mirrors a
societal transition from the industrialization of economies featuring industrialized warfare to the informatization of economies featuring the informatization of
warfare. Future wars will still be bloody and messy,
but increasingly less so, if required. A military officer’s
characterization of information technology as “America’s gift to warfare” may yet find its validity in this
context.168
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The future armed forces will feature “information
corps,” just as those of the past had an air corps a century earlier, while a new concept of warrior, an “information warrior,” will emerge.169 Enhanced integration
of information technologies will provide gains, range,
and scalability in military operations on levels comparable or exceeding those of blitzkrieg and aircraft carriers during World War II. Full-spectrum dominance
and dominant battlespace awareness will no longer
be just the buzz words, getting closer to “eliminating
the Clausewitzian friction of war” in conflicts between
superior and inferior militaries.170 Sun Tzu’s Art of
War, written centuries ago and emphasizing deception, manipulation, and information operations, will
not just live but thrive in the 21st century. Depending
on the opponent, select high-tech and digitized forces
might display Sun Tzu’s “acme of skill” and win without fighting—an aspiration of today’s militaries. While
the U.S. military will be the most digitized, other peer
competitors will also be digitizing their forces, denying it the sought-after full-spectrum dominance and
dominant battlespace awareness.
Space and cyber domain adaptation and exploitation. The militarization of space and cyber domains is
a major component of the emerging military revolution. Both will become more critical for ballistic missile
defense; nuclear policies; communications; navigation;
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; precision;
and global strike capabilities and regimes. The United
States, Russia, EU members, and Japan—and increasingly China, India, and South Korea—are all pursuing military space and cyber capabilities.171 China, for
instance, wants to build a space station and is preparing for unmanned and manned missions to the moon
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in 2017 and 2025.172 Of some 70 governmental space
agencies, at least 13 already have launch capabilities.
A growing number of nonstate actors (Space-X, Blue
Origin, Virgin Galactic, Bigelow Aerospace, Planetary
Resources, etc.) seek to bring men to space, create space
habitats, or mine asteroids.173
By 2050, China and Russia’s space capabilities will
be far more menacing, and their current opposition to
space militarization174 (strike fighting systems, anti-satellite systems, space-based ballistic missile defenses)
will be a guide of future warfare. The continued development of global navigation satellite systems by major
actors and the use of highly sensitive remote sensors
will have important military and commercial applications. While its space and cyber capabilities will
be unrivaled,175 the United States (and others for that
matter) will face challenges weaponizing the domains,
given constraints of spacepower and cyberpower theorization, let alone integration.
All space powers will seek strategic outcomes on
Earth and in space through the integration and utilization of space, cyber, land, air, sea, nuclear, and special
operations. While surprise reconnaissance and bombings from orbit will take the time to materialize, the
need for a unified theory of air, space, and cyber power
in joint operations will become more pronounced.176
Transformation of weapons systems. The development and integration of new weapon systems, tactics,
and strategies will define the weapons transformation
process with an emphasis on networking. As Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “Possibly the single-most transforming thing in our force will not be
a weapon system, but a set of interconnections and a
substantially enhanced capability.”177
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Precision systems (which have separated humans
from the act of direct killing)178 and faster, more lethal,
and highly maneuverable hypersonic missiles capable
of penetrating the strongest missile defense shields will
play an expanded role. During the Gulf War, guided
bombs accounted for 10 percent of the ordnance used;
in recent conflicts, this has risen to 90 percent. This
number is expected to increase, potentially substituting
for low-yield nuclear weapons and targeting larger missile, aircraft, ship, and submarine forces.179 Enhanced
wide-area airborne surveillance and remotely piloted
air systems capabilities providing high-resolution
views and helping expose enemy operations will grow
in use. The U.S. military is already testing long endurance multi-intelligence vehicles—developing an even
larger Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
large unmanned airship system—and is making rapid
advances in electro-optical infrared camera systems.
For example, Gorgon Stare and ARGUS have been
designated to design a nearly full-motion video of 12
independently steered spots and to transmit that video
directly to the warfighter.180
New military technologies, upgrades, and applications will include physical, mental, and emotional
enhancements to soldiers; smart improvised technology and micro robotics; bioagents; space weaponry;
directed energy weapons; direct-ascent satellite weapons; satellite jammers; cyber-measures; and anti-access
strategies.181 An Active Denial System using intolerable heat waves to deter enemies and the Airborne
Laser using an aircraft-mounted laser to target ballistic
missiles will likely become a reality. Operational projects, such as a littoral combat ship to support the U.S.
Sea Shield Concept, F-22A Raptor to support the U.S.
Global Strike Concept of Operations, and the Quick
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Kill Active Protection System to destroy rocket propelled grenades and anti-tank guided missiles will see
major upgrades. Processes will evolve, too. The U.S.
Army’s Future Force Capstone Concept, Modular
Force, and Force Generation will bring enhancements
across processes, organization, and people, enhancing its battlespace awareness, expeditionary and joint
capabilities. Meanwhile, low-observable traits and
electronics functions will grow in importance to offset
other countries’ capabilities, increasingly denying the
United States a fully permissive airspace.182
Truly autonomous weapons systems will start
emerging, with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
likely replacing manned aircraft for most missions as
part of the robotization of warfare.183 Autonomous
aerial refueling and airborne communication relay will
emerge as new roles, streamlining operations.184 The
development of artificial intelligence will make self-directing of select systems a widespread development,185
heralding socio-economic shifts. As Vassily Leontief,
an economist, stated:
Computers and robots replace humans in the exercise of
mental functions in the same way as mechanical power
replaced them in the performance of physical tasks. As
time goes on, more and more complex mental functions
will be replaced by machines. . . . This means that the role
of humans as the most important factor of production is
bound to diminish in the same way that the role of horses
in agricultural production was first diminished and then
eliminated by the introduction of tractors.186 As of 2013,
at least 88 nations were either developing, purchasing
or deploying military robotics.187 But organizational
and technological barriers will stand in the way, as the
case of the U.S. Low-Cost Autonomous Attack System
development has shown.188
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WMD and missile proliferation. A more increased
risk of WMD and missile proliferation awaits the world
of 2050. Technological advances in the military and
their proliferation and integration within civilian sectors will enable a larger number of actors to develop,
acquire, and use WMD. The civilian infrastructure will
become a more vulnerable and popular target for state
and nonstate entities. Think of an intentional or inadvertent nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan,
or a nuclear attack by North Korea against a likely
nuclear weapons-capable South Korea. Consider the
probability of biological attacks, with a killing trail
extending from one corner of the world to another
through a series of layovers along the way. As societies depend more on cyber networks and automation,
a cyberattack will become a preferred and designated
WMD, capable of wiping out entire economic sectors
in the highly interconnected global cyber grid.
Meanwhile, the risk of authoritarian regimes and
terrorists acquiring WMD capability will increase,
especially in the area of biological agents because of
reduced technical barriers and manufacturing costs.189
The number of nuclear weapons-capable states will
grow. In 2011, at least 35 states had plans to build
nuclear reactors by 2030.190 Unlike Russia and the
United States, they will lack the experience or “strategic space” featuring a second-strike capability, big
arsenals, and low-vulnerability launch platforms.191
The missile development and proliferation, “decoupling” from WMD proliferation, will speed up
considerably:
as the growing availability of ‘increasingly powerful
conventional munitions and more accurate missiles’
allows missile arsenals to serve the more traditional
airpower roles.192
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China is a candidate for both and could produce
up to 800 nuclear warheads in the near future, a key
factor for the “global nuclear balance of power.”193
Meanwhile, competition in hypersonic missile development will intensify, marking a continuous military
race involving offensive and defense systems.
Implications for the Global Operational Threat Environment and the U.S. Military
Big interstate wars will become less appealing and
more rare, but not impossible (think nuclear-armed
India and Pakistan).194 Weapons systems using computer-brain interfaces will remove humans from the
line of fire and reduce casualties. But they could also
prompt more conflicts, as the perceived operational
benefits could outweigh costs in opponents’ human
lives.195 The role of conventional forces will diminish,
as new types of conflicts and missions emerge focusing on the urban, space, cyber, and civilian protection
operations. Special operations will play a more prominent role serving advisory, diplomatic, and civilian
functions, as the appetite for larger missions fades and
the number and potency of unconventional threats
increases.196
These factors will force cuts within the U.S. military in some areas and increases in budgets for other
areas mentioned above.197 The United States will rely
on technology to compensate for labor resources.
But increased technological dependency will make it
impossible, as the Army’s Capstone Concept underlines, for the U.S. military to operate with all systems
intact.198 The U.S. military’s challenge, therefore, will
lie in integrating new technologies without being
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“institutionally undone by them”—all while meeting
the needs of a transformed society.199
This will entail understanding the growing informatization of military forces and war, featuring the
growing role of information and automated systems
required to process it. As the data-driven warfare
expands, more granular and wider mass surveillance
capabilities will define a security state, challenging
domestic and international legal frameworks.200 Information technology will enable dispersed forces to
better synchronize operations and even take over an
opponent’s “operational level system” in what could
be described as the “New American Way of War.”201
But while the new skillset could approach Sun
Tzu’s “acme of skill,”202 related capabilities of other
countries will advance significantly, undermining the
U.S. current “technological overmatch” across all military domains. Such capabilities today and in the future
will include communications and encryption software,
precision-guided missiles and mortars, advanced
mobile and man-portable air defenses, anti-satellite
systems, anti-ship missiles, and long-range ballistic missiles.203 The United States will be prompted to
develop counter capabilities: offensive and defensive
cyber measures; long-range strike capability; munitions for underground targets; anti-guided weapons
systems; resilient ISR platforms; and systems to suppress enemy defenses.204
Adapting and exploiting space and cyber domains
will be crucial. Military space missions increasingly
will shift from support as defined by management
of on-orbit assets, to force enhancement designed to
enhance the effectiveness of operations on Earth, to
space control involving kinetic and non-kinetic effects.
U.S. satellites will become more vulnerable to attack
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as other countries acquire satellites and anti-satellite
capabilities. Select powers, such as the United States,
China, and Russia, might attempt to place independent kinetic kill vehicles in launch and early orbit to
deny space entry or transit to any other state. Meanwhile, decoupling “hard” and “soft” space power will
prove difficult, increasing the risk of conflict on Earth
as well as in and over space.
Electronic jamming or destruction of satellite
uplinks and downlinks will be accompanied by the
development and deployment of space-based non-nuclear, hyperkinetic weapons against fixed high-value
and heavily defended targets on earth.205 The United
States is now deploying a space-based infrared system
with revolutionary early warning system components
for missile defense that it intends to utilize to create the
theater event system against growing ballistic missile
threats.206 But given space conditions, achieving the
disruption rather than the control of space is easier:
a USD$1 bag of marbles can easily destroy a USD$1
billion satellite. Lack of direct threats to U.S. on-orbit
assets and consensus on the space militarization will
continue to impede space weaponization, just as the
growing space capabilities of actors will push the trend
forward.207
The space and cyber domain adaptation will
involve the development and deployment of enhanced
old and transformational, along with new weapons
systems, especially precision and directed energy systems. This will prompt an adoption of countermeasures to ensure survivability of one’s weapons systems.
Short-range precision strike systems will become more
popular, and an intercontinental precision strike capability could become a potentially widespread reality.
The U.S. military is already developing a conventional
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prompt global strike system.208 China and Russia are
seeking it, though little information is available about
related programs in open sources. Meanwhile, all
three, plus India, are developing hypersonic missiles
and defenses against them.
Long-range precision strike systems will expose
military and civilian infrastructure, reminding us of
the threat of strategic bombings and coercion during
the Cold War era. Keeping another state’s civilian
infrastructure at risk will be a popular way to achieve
limited objectives. Meanwhile, broader stability will
depend on each side possessing an assured survivable
retaliatory capability, this time likely based on precision strike systems, not just nuclear weapons. The U.S.
military strategies relying on forward-based assets will
become more vulnerable.209 States or terrorists capable
of deploying an electromagnetic pulse with strength
equivalent to a nuclear weapon explosion will become
a real concern in the coming decades.210
As with precision-guided systems, advances
in missile technologies and strategies will undercut WMD nonproliferation efforts. The global proliferation of short- and medium-range ballistic and
ground-launched cruise missiles will undermine the
Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty. Actors will continue to develop and upgrade their anti-missile defense
systems, focusing on directed energy systems.211 China
will rely on its nuclear arsenal and new technologies,
presenting the largest threat to U.S. military capabilities. Already, China is modernizing its nuclear forces
to ensure a second-strike capability, increasing the
number of warheads, solid-fueled, road-mobile ballistic missiles, and nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines.212
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Other nuclear weapons states, not just China, will
be upgrading their arsenals as part of an arms race featuring a larger number of actors and more menacing
capabilities. The risk of nuclear exchange will grow
as nuclear-armed states will perceive increased reliance on space for operations in space and on Earth as
an effort to undermine their nuclear deterrence. The
United States, Russia, Israel, China, India, Pakistan,
North Korea, and Iran will remain the focus of nuclear
weapons developments. India, Pakistan, and China are
on track to nuclearize the Indian Ocean with at sea-deployments of nuclear weapons.213 Meanwhile, Israel’s
and Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons capabilities
create incentives for other states in the region, namely
Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, to develop their own.
This is a dangerous development given the lack of risk
management frameworks in the two fast-militarizing
and conflict-prone regions, respectively.
Overall, autonomous and precision systems,
armed robotics, and other technologies will challenge
the international law, prompting the development of
“ethics” software214 and entirely new rules and treaties
regulating their development and use. This is critical,
as advances in self-directed and artificial intelligence
technologies could undermine human control.215
Recommendations for the U.S. Department of Defense,
Department of State, and the Military
• Develop and upgrade a unified theory of joint
operations across all domains emphasizing
decentralization, experimentation, and autonomous approach to military operations.
• Identify best practices of organizational and
technological change integration within other
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•

•

•

•

•

•

•

domains in order to enhance the space and
cyber domain adaptation and exploitation.
Create an interagency body to advance the
enhancement and integration of space and
cyber power and a taskforce to monitor foreign
space and cyber assets and capabilities.
Enhance the survivability of critical bases, space
and cyber systems, as well as develop low-tech
solutions to address vulnerabilities stemming
from cyber and electronic threats.
Advance space de-weaponization and rules
regarding collisions and interference with space
assets as well as the use of lasers and conduct of
regular and crisis communications.
Enhance the experimentation of disruptive
technologies, especially autonomous weapons
and artificial intelligence technologies, in their
interoperable and integrated mission mode,
while employing proper safeguards in order to
minimize unintended outcomes.
Focus the WMD nonproliferation campaign on
the emerging nuclear-weapons capable states
and actors pursuing advanced missile capabilities, in part by revisiting treaties.
Pursue a distributed sensor and interceptor
architecture to defend dispersed targets in what
should be a layered security system to protect
both civilian and military assets.
Conduct more wargaming, simulations, and
scenario planning involving multiple nuclear
powers and featuring conventional and/or
nuclear exchanges by allies and partners.
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Wild Card: Self-aware Armed Robotics—Wither the
Human Control
The development and use of fundamentally
new weapon systems, military technologies, and
operational concepts drive the military revolution,
now in its full swing. Armed robotics and autonomous systems are deployed for different missions
and across all military domains. The sophistication of such systems leaves little room for human
errors and a country’s own casualties, reflecting a
strong view within a high-tech U.S. society that
technology is a panacea for challenges of human
and non-human origin. Artificial intelligence
machines become an accepted phenomenon and
component in the civilian and military sectors—
one that is cost-effective and efficient. Relying
on armed robotics and artificial intelligence, the
U.S. military wins more wars, and with fewer
casualties and errors. But this increased technological reliance now leaves matters of control
to the machine. Cases of the systems overriding
human-programmed tasks become more frequent
until they undermine human control, initiating
coordinated yet unsanctioned strikes that cause
unintended conflicts and numerous casualties
abroad. Humans eventually restore control over
the machines. But the growing number of such
incidents and the continued development of the
autonomous and robotic systems has now made
possible, for the first time in human history, for
an intelligent machine to decide the fate of the
humankind.
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Regional Economic, Technological, and Military
Races
Future State
Some regions will achieve unprecedented levels
of development in the coming decades. Others will
see their economies slow considerably. A reformatted
economic architecture will emerge, featuring a significantly diminished U.S. influence and enhanced capabilities of powers previously on the sidelines of global
geopolitics. More states will use the enhanced capabilities to advance their interests. But the established
powers will mount stiff resistance, with competition
intensifying over new strategic resources and markets.
Of all the regions, Asia is projected to account for the
largest share of global GDP. This will mark the reversal of domination of Western economies, the return of
China and India to the center of global economic gravity, and the emergence of other economic powerhouses
in Asia, such as Indonesia.
This global economic configuration will feature
China as the largest economy by GDP, likely followed
by the United States and India. European and the U.S.
shares of global GDP are expected to decline to a mere
23 percent.216 The U.S. GDP is projected to increase to
USD$35.1 trillion; Japan’s, USD$6.7 trillion; and Germany’s, USD$3.6 trillion. China is expected to hit a
USD$44.4 trillion mark; India, USD$27.8 trillion; Brazil,
USD$6.11 trillion; and Russia, USD$5.9 trillion.217
The Chinese worker will earn USD$31,000 per year;
Italian, USD$41,000; German, USD$49,000; French,
USD$52,000; the United Kingdom, USD$59,000; Japanese, USD$67,000; and the United States, USD$83,000.218
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North America. Absent major strategic failures,
including extended foreign policy (mis)adventures,
the United States will retain its absolute position as the
global technological and military leader. It will also
enjoy favorable demographic and immigration conditions as well as a robust technological and R&D infrastructure feeding its economic and military dynamism.
It will continue to boast the largest share of global
management resources. However, its relative position
across all areas will decline compared to ascending
powers, primarily in Asia. It increasingly will have
to share the “pie” and work with state and nonstate
actors to achieve more limited goals using more limited means.219
Canada and Mexico will elevate their status in
world affairs. But it will be Mexico that will see a
more accelerating change, starting from a lower base
yet enjoying a rapid growth and deepening links with
countries of Central and South America and farther
ashore. While it will still be a key economic partner to
the United States, it might see a mild decoupling from
its northern partner as it shifts its gaze south. It has
already pushed for the creation of an economic alliance with Columbia, Peru, and Chile, a market of 206
million consumers that accounts for 36 percent of the
Latin American GDP.220 Canada, in turn, will see its
role grow in the Arctic, where competition will ramp
up as ice melts and clears the area for transit development, trade, and resource exploitation.
South and Latin America. South America might
see its status as a dormant region shattered, coming out
of the periphery of global affairs as a counterweight to
other regions on economic and security issues. Leveraging its resource and demographic potential, it might
outdo select Asian countries in terms of economic
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growth.221 The region’s middle class grew from 21 to
35 percent of the population between 2003 and 2013
and is expected to increase significantly by 2050. As
in other areas, a number of powers will emerge in the
region with a far stronger voice and ability to shape
regional and, importantly, global outcomes. Meanwhile, a face-down in the political arena will continue
between “the left” and “the right,” with the appeal of
“market-friendly ideas concerning rule of law and economic and social management” increasing, if recent
successes are an indication.222
While major development challenges could prevent it from becoming a great global power in the 21st
century, Brazil stands a chance of attaining at least a
status of a major, second power center in the Western
hemisphere. The growing economic and political ties
between Brazil and major powers demonstrates the
country’s and the region’s rising and hefty geopolitical
profile, even if it also reflects the growing competition
between major powers worldwide. China’s engagement in the region stands out especially in this regard.
It is driving the region’s integration from within and
without, enhancing the geopolitical roles of Brazil,
Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru.223 Time
is not too far off when the United States will be forced
to invoke assertively the Monroe Doctrine to fight off
China’s growing geopolitical encroachment in the
region.
Europe and Eurasia. Europe will grow older and
less dynamic, with countries of eastern and central
Europe still catching up but inching closer to the economic status of their Western neighbors. Following
the coming Brexit and given the concerns of Grexit,
the EU is unlikely to survive in the current format.
The dynamic states will include Germany and Poland.
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The United Kingdom will continue trailing the United
States, with its global influence eroding decade after
decade. Germany and France will likely be more assertive in regional and global affairs, as U.S. interventionism declines, and allies pick up the slack in providing
for the security of the global commons and regional
orders. Meanwhile, increased migration pressures
from the Middle East and North Africa, as well as
increased terrorism risks, will challenge the security
and vision of a liberal Europe. Russia could emerge as
a major global economic power if it addresses widespread corruption, invests and scales the development
of high-tech sectors, and concentrates on economic
development rather than overseas adventures. The
alternative is a depopulated, authoritarian, and undiversified Russia engaged in imperial expansion rather
than much-needed country-wide development.
Central Asia and the South Caucasus might see
their fortunes reverse, as China, India, Russia, the
United States, EU, and Iran facilitate economic linkages within Eurasia (sometimes working at cross-purposes).224 Major developments to watch will be a
generational transition of rulers and governance systems, as well as the regional strategic rivalry involving
China and Russia, and later India. Depending on how
Russia fares in the coming decades, Beijing could sideline Moscow in Central Asia again, this time militarily,
while India, and less so Iran and Turkey, could come
closer to doing so in the economic arena.225 Barring
those dynamics, change in the regions largely will be
evolutionary, in large part subject to twists and turns in
Russia, China, Turkey, India, and Iran. The relatively
open Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan will be on track to modernize their governance systems. The more insulated countries like Uzbekistan,
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Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and, less so, Armenia will
open up or be forced to become more transparent and
integrated within their regions if they want to accelerate their development.226
The future of Afghanistan will be critical for a transformed Central-South Asia. The rise of India, China,
and potentially Iran will offer Kabul and the region
a shot at accelerated development. Alas, it will take
more than China and India to turn the proclaimed Silk
Road interconnector into a viable entity not dependent
on internal conflict, outside assistance, and external
military presence. While becoming a more reliable and
integrated link in the Eurasian chain of trade, energy,
and transit connectivity, Afghanistan might have an
opportunity to become a middle-income economy,
provided good and stable governance takes hold in
this war-torn country.227
Africa. Ethnic conflicts, resource wars, civil wars,
state failures, and terrorist enclaves will still plot the
geopolitical fabric of the continent, occasionally drawing interventions, increasingly by non-Western states.
But from among many diverse countries, stars will
likely emerge. South Africa and Nigeria, boasting more
advanced political and economic resources and mobilization potential, might turn into economic heavyweights and increasingly set the continent’s agenda.
As information technologies continue to spread and
global connectivity engulfs even the most remote
areas, a larger number of African countries will open
up. Poverty levels and health epidemics will decrease
dramatically thanks to new technological and agricultural advances available to and, in some cases, developed by countries in Africa. Along with the Middle
East, Africa will have plenty of opportunities to do the
catching up, and do it faster. Meanwhile, an enhanced
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economic and military presence of Asian powers on
the continent will reflect a reformatted global influence
structure, with Western powers ceding some of their
positions to the emerged and rising powers of the East.
China and India will become major political and military players, building and using a string of military
bases scattered along the continent’s major coastlines.
Urbanization dynamics will accelerate on the continent. Lagos, home to 14 million people, and Kinshasa,
home to 12 million, are expected to outgrow Cairo in
territorial and population size by 2020 alone. Trading
centers in many African countries will become cities.
Nigeria is on track to soon have 100 cities boasting more
than 200,000 residents. Demographic and resource use
pressures, droughts, and floods due to climate change
will diminish soil fertility and vegetation. Desertification, for instance, already threatens sub-Saharan Africa
more than any other area, with deforestation in the
region occurring at twice the global rate. Meanwhile,
water stress is projected to impact some 75 to 250 million people in Africa, with expected impact on internal and external migration affecting numerous regions
within Africa and beyond. Dealing with urbanization
and climate change pressures will be a major challenge
for African countries in the coming decades as they
rely on a mix of political centralization and decentralization tools to navigate the “technology- and development-induced changes” and “ethnic divisions.”228
The Middle East. The Middle East will feature its
stars and losers as well, with the former successfully
leveraging their youth bulges to accelerate economic
development. Saudi Arabia increasingly will attempt
to position itself as a major regional geopolitical power.
Turkey and Iran will emerge as the most dynamic
states. Iran’s potential larger-scale integration into
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the global economic system and likely transformation
of its political system will reformat the geopolitics of
the region. Iran might again become an anchor of the
U.S. regional foreign policy and achieve a détente with
Israel.
The competition will intensify between Persian
Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey
for the dominant geopolitical role.229 Already, military
rivalries are in full swing, with proxy wars ongoing in
various theaters. Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen will still
be the battlegrounds of such rivalry, with their political systems struggling to consolidate. The Middle East,
therefore, will remain the region with a high potential
for state disintegration and formation.
Meanwhile, the region’s oil-rich states will seek to
diversify their economies because of depleting oil and
gas reserves,230 and because of reduced demand from
external economies that will be undergoing their own
transitions from predominantly fossil fuel-based to
more diversified and more renewables-based economic
systems. Nuclear power development will play a more
prominent role. Nuclear proliferation potentially will
result in the emergence of new nuclear weapons-capable states in the face of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and
Egypt.231
Southeast Asia. Asia will again emerge as an economic success story, but with a major twist in the Part
II series. The geopolitics and military arms races, not
just the geo-economics and business opportunities,
increasingly will define it. Another group of Asian
tigers will be born in the face of Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam. As the
National Intelligence Council put it, China will become
more assertive, India will be more economically significant, Japan will return to a normal state, and Indonesia
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will emerge as a major economy in what will be a redefined geo-economic order.232 China and India will have
become truly global giants, returning to their status of
having the large economies they once enjoyed when
they commanded almost half of the global output in
previous centuries, only if they manage to avoid the
middle-income traps.233
Their rise will intensify the economic and military
competition, making the conflict over disputed territories more frequent, and not just within their sub-regions. Regional arms races and nationalism will unfold
in full swing. The Indian, Pacific, and the Arctic oceans,
like the Trans-Atlantic one before them, will emerge as
the area of growing global geostrategic rivalry234 featuring China, India, and the United States as prominent actors. Instability in Asia will flare in the South
China Sea and parts of Central and Southeast Asia,235
reshaping the traditional Asian security and economic
orders. The United States, China, and India will agree
on a tri-pillar regional management or face instability, as other states become pawns or puppeteers in the
game of bandwagoning, counterbalance, cooperation,
confrontation, and proxy wars in the once Zen Asia.
Beijing and Delhi will be far more capable of challenging their rivals in areas outside their regions, both
on the side of stabilization and destabilization.236 Their
outsized military capabilities and intentions will now
determine the prospects for global stability. China’s
military budget is now on track to overshadow the U.S.
one. China will have more advanced aircraft, submarines, and ballistic and cruise missiles, likely undermining U.S. “overwhelming superiority” by 2050.237 China
already is rapidly growing its aerospace, maritime surveillance, high-powered microwave electronics weapons, high-performance radars, and cyber capabilities.

67

Meanwhile, India is investing in laser weapons, its air
force, theater missiles, and missile defense systems.
It is developing a layered, hardened air defense relying on reconnaissance satellites, early warning radars,
UAVs, and Airborne Warning and Control Systems.238
China and India’s military rise will have reawakened Japan as a military state. Japan is already deploying a space-based intelligence network, integrating into
the U.S. ballistic missile defense shield, and upgrading
maritime security capabilities of China’s uneasy partners.239 As China and India’s military capabilities and
roles expand, Japan will be forced to develop itself
into a major power capable of defending itself and
its partners militarily. But the development of China’s and India’s overall capabilities is not assured.
After all, they suffer from inequality, uneven growth,
rapid urbanization, gender imbalances, water scarcity,
environmental degradation, social unrest, terrorism,
and insurgencies—enough potentially to derail their
trajectories.240
Meanwhile, climate change will present a major
challenge for the region, as its heavily populated
coastal zones will face a major risk of flooding and
destruction due to storm surges and sea level rises in
the coming decades. Societies in China, Malaysia, and
the Philippines already view climate change as their
top threat. Those in Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea
put it in their top three. Air population is another challenge. Of the 25 most polluted cities, 15 are in South
Asia, and more than 20 cities in India “enjoy” air quality worse than the “suffocating” Beijing.241 Expect this
to worsen in the medium term as the rest of China,
India, and Southeast Asia urbanize, and time passes
before relevant policies and technologies start mitigating the impact.
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The Arctic and Antarctica. By 2035-2050, parts of
the Arctic may have ice-free summers, allowing for
seasonal maritime and trade activities in and through
the region.242 Passage through the ocean will offer the
shortest shipping distance between Asia and the West,
facilitating trade, transit, and development of carbon
and other resources. Nikolai Patrushev, a secretary of
the Russian Security Council, asserted that Russia must
turn the Arctic into its “main strategic resource base,”
admitting the possibility of military conflict over the
area as the regional military competition and territorial
disputes grow. Russia considers the Arctic key to its
military strategy to ensure a second-strike capability,
especially as hypersonic missiles, lasers, and missile
defense systems continue to receive the attention of
major powers. In the coming decades, expect more military deployments as part of yet another period of the
region’s militarization, once marked by rocket launch
warning systems, nuclear submarines, spy planes, and
strategic aviation bases during the Cold War.243
Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway will treat
parts of the Arctic as their territorial or internal waters.
This is in opposition to the United States, Sweden,
Iceland, and Finland that will view the area as a free
navigation space. An already revived conflict over the
status of the North Pole will grow. In 2007, while Denmark was contesting Canada’s claim, Russia planted
its flag under the North Pole.244 Russia, the United
States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland,
and Sweden will continue upgrading their military
and coast guard capabilities in the region.245 But it is
the growing involvement of non-Arctic powers that
will mark a major departure in the region. Of the likely
candidates, China will stand out as the global trading
power playing a key commercial and geopolitical role.
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After all, the region’s deposits reportedly contain more
than 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,700 trillion cubic feet
of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of liquid natural
gas.246
The geopolitical importance of Antarctica will also
grow, manifesting in increased interest from Russia,
China, and claimant states (Australia, New Zealand,
Norway) amid climate change.247
The Global Commons. Climate change, resource
scarcity, enhanced global interactions, and military
and technological advances will increasingly prompt
countries to venture into the Global Commons—the
high seas, the atmosphere, Antarctica, cyber, and outer
space. The last decades already have witnessed an
accelerating development, use, and exploitation of the
Global Commons.248 This trend will only accelerate, as
many more countries leverage their larger economic
and military capabilities to pursue wealth and status
beyond their borders. Coastal and increasingly offshore development will be wider and deeper in scale,
whether in the field of ocean farming,249 carbons development, or territorial enlargement. Meanwhile, piracy
and terrorism will prompt further militarization of
the high seas,250 while growing trade flows will make
the freedom of navigation an even more important
pillar of global security, one that China and India, not
just the United States, will defend. As a result, all the
Global Commons will see new rule sets emerge regulating activities of state and nonstate actors. Cyber,
space, and the high seas will exhibit a larger potential
for militarization and, by implication, interstate frictions or wars in the coming decades.
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Implications for the Global Operational Threat
Environment and the U.S. Military
Parts of the Middle East, Africa, and Eurasia will
continue to have fragile or broken governance systems, marked by civil wars, proxy conflicts, resource
wars, climate change-induced stresses, and terrorist
activities. This means we are in for another century of
occasional interventions, increasingly of humanitarian
nature and led by non-Western powers. The Indo-AsiaPacific will see an unprecedented level of interstate tensions, nationalism, and conflicts.251 Now a major global
power, India will be a key actor in the strategic rivalry
unfolding in the area and involving the United States
and Japan on the one hand, and China on the other.
Meanwhile, smaller states will seek security reassurances from the former without upsetting the latter—an
increasingly difficult act.
In addition to geographic areas, an especially
intense rivalry will play out in cyber, space, and the
Global Commons, as countries leverage enhanced economic and military capabilities to advance their objectives and jostle over markets, resources, opportunities,
and sources of influence. While the U.S. position will
decline in all geographic and functional areas, the
United States will retain a more comprehensive suite
of capabilities positioning it as the ultimate global
leader, one that nevertheless will share and compromise more than ever before. The U.S. military will be
prompted to develop and rely more on its capabilities
in cyber, space, the Arctic, and the Global Commons,
while paying greater attention to the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
Despite concerns about Russia’s adventures on the
EU’s doorstep, the U.S. military posture in Europe will
dwindle, partly because it will have a tightened purse
and partly because it will be forced to use the freed-up
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resources to manage the evolving security order in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific. In the Middle East, its posture will
become lighter, as the U.S. military downgrades the
status and decreases the number of permanent military facilities. In Central Asia, rotational forces and
prepositioned equipment and supplies will define its
posture, but Russia’s and, increasingly, China’s presence will deny it a robust military role. In Africa and
Latin America, small and specialized forces will continue to be the hallmarks of the U.S. presence.252 But
China’s growing military partnerships with Latin
American states will prompt a shift to a more scaled
U.S. regional military presence. Meanwhile, European
and Asian partners and rivals will increasingly seek
military bases and pursue interventions in parts of
Africa and the Middle East.
As it recalibrates its military posture, the United
States will increasingly rely on its allies to manage
regional orders, especially in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
where it will welcome more dynamic security and geopolitical roles by Japan, India, and potentially Indonesia and Malaysia. Meanwhile, a new global operational
threat environment and strategic landscape will force
the reshaping of NATO. The 21st century’s geopolitical
dynamics will make it or break it. The alliance might
remain the strongest security bloc, but in a different
format and with a different set of missions, certainly in
the age of fiscal constraints and calls for rejuvenation
and agreed burden-sharing to address the emerging
threats. If it does, it might even have new members
from Southeast Asia.
At a minimum, expect NATO members to pursue
situational relations with non-members on a caseby-case basis, with such flexibility at times harming
the standing of the alliance and at times helping it
achieve better outcomes through missions increasingly
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emphasizing urban, humanitarian, rule of law, reconstruction, cyber, space, and special operations. The
U.S. military will be building its distributed sensor
and interceptor architecture, linking its capabilities
with allies and partners within and outside NATO’s
framework.253 It will also seek to strengthen the allies
militarily and cultivate new friends while developing
a global ballistic missile defense (BMD) architecture,
directed energy systems, cyber, and space measures to
offset adversaries’ capabilities.254
Recommendations for the U.S. Department of Defense,
Department of State, and the Military
• Identify the rising stars and underperformers,
and concentrate resources on helping shape the
foreign policy conduct of the former and internal policy conduct of the latter.
• Enhance ties with Mexico, Brazil, Canada, Iran,
India, and Japan to shape geopolitical dynamics
in the Middle East, South America, the Arctic,
and the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
• Support the economic and security integration
initiatives/institutions in Europe and Asia.
• Work with China, India, Pakistan, and Iran to
promote trans-Eurasian economic connectivity
by supporting the development of Afghanistan
and Central Asian states.
• In coordination with partners and allies, advance
trade, transit, and resources exploration rules
while addressing the risks of militarization and
lingering disputes in/over the Arctic.
• Promote WMD and ballistic missile non-proliferation and slow down the militarization of the
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Middle East, the Arctic, the Indo-Asia-Pacific,
and the Global Commons.
• Recalibrate the military posture by developing
and deploying enhanced assets and capabilities
in the Arctic, the Indo-Asia-Pacific, cyber, space,
and the Global Commons.
• Encourage allies to play a more autonomous
security role in respective regions while deconflicting relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia;
Turkey and Iran, India, and China.
• Shape the rules of conduct/expectations
regarding state interventions by non-Western
powers, creating deployable culturally-aware
teams for reconstruction/rule of law tasks.
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Wild Card—From “Cold” to “Hot”—The Coming War
over the Arctic
If you thought that space and cyber were the
only new areas requiring national resources to
exploit and leverage them in pursuit of geopolitical
objectives, think again. The Arctic increasingly is
drawing in major powers, as climate change opens a
new globally significant trade and transit artery via
the Arctic Ocean, enabling resource exploration and
exploitation. Anticipating this monumental shift,
major regional and, importantly, outside powers
start pursuing political, economic, military, and
security mechanisms to stake their claims and solidify their positions before competition denies them
the anticipated fruits of climate change. Increasingly, new legal regimes emerge, national economic
and military activities intensify, and economic and
military alliances and partnerships become more
pronounced. But while laws are established and
rules start regulating the local areas of economic
activity, latent disputes over territory occasionally
erupt like a volcano, turning the “cold” into “hot.”
Russia and China find themselves up against the
United States, Japan, and some EU members, with
military collisions and harassment of civilian and
military vessels turning the Arctic into yet another
South China Sea. Either by a miscalculation or
design, a military encounter in the Arctic waters
between a Russian and a Canadian ship results in
a brief military exchange. As a NATO member, the
United States wishes to assist, but going up against
nuclear-armed Russia is a no-go. A great war is
averted eventually, but skirmishes and economic
and legal scrambles continue to flare up, threatening to erupt into a major war.
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TOWARD A STAND-READY, POST-MODERN
MILITARY
We are made wise not by the recollection of the past but
by the responsibility for the future. . .255
								

— ZOO

. . . plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.256
					

— President Dwight D. Eisenhower

The U.S. military of 2050 should be flexible and
resilient, capable of navigating rapidly changing
dynamics across functional and regional spectrums
defining the global operational threat environment
and strategic landscape. Otherwise, protecting U.S.
interests in a reformatted and continuously evolving
world will be a fruitless enterprise, one that will hasten
the perceived decline of the United States as the greatest military power the world has ever known. The U.S.
military should thus understand, adapt, and prepare
for the implications from the demographic, environmental, socio-economic, political, technological, military, and region-specific dynamics.
As far as the demographic trends, the population
growth in the industrialized states will reverse or slow
down. Parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast
Asia will have large and youthful populations. In North
America, Europe, and East Asia, populations will grow
even older. Internal and external migration flows will
increase, just as the population growth in poor countries will be susceptible to climate change. Urbanization will reach unprecedented levels. Local governance
systems will be under considerable pressure: some
will collapse and invite interventions, others will
have to be more inventive to make it through. Aging
could bring more peace at the expense of economic
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dynamism, while youth bulges could be a blessing or
a curse subject to the performance of local polities. The
protection of cities will rise in importance, as local and
overseas civilian and military agencies join forces to
protect civilian targets. The U.S. and other militaries
will rely more on technologies, recruitment of women,
and lenient immigration rules to field their forces as
recruitment pools shallow due to aging populations.
The U.S. military will need to foster new alliances for
peacekeeping operations in countries with weak governance and youth bulges, as well as enhance civilian
and military protection systems for cities at home.
In terms of the environmental trends, climate
change effects, resource consumption and depletion,
and water scarcity will become more profound and
widespread, despite new environmental management
solutions. Some areas will experience more conflict,
population displacement, and refugees’ migration due
to food supply disruptions, hurricanes, storms, and
rising sea levels. Taken together, these factors might
overwhelm the capabilities of military and security
institutions in select countries, certainly in the case of
a major flooding impacting megacities in Southeast
Asia, straining the response capacities of more prepared ones.
Humanitarian operations will grow in numbers,
just as interventions to access strategic resources, especially water and rare earth minerals. Virtual water trade
will help some, but not all countries. The U.S. military
will need to develop climate change risk management
frameworks involving closer coordination between
domestic and overseas military and civilian agencies;
pinpoint areas with the highest potential for systemic
collapse and formulate related responses; identify
areas of strategic resources and develop operational
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scenarios for overseas involvement to secure them;
define more clearly the legal and operational roles of
the U.S. military in responding to humanitarian disasters; and advance climate change-related security and
military cooperation.
Regarding the cultural, socio-economic, and political trends, the rebalancing of the global order and
power hierarchy will continue (especially as Asian
powers advance up the ranks), featuring the converging global economy, democratization, and related
counter-pressures. The global energy infrastructure
will rely on a wider use of renewables. More powers
will assume the role of regional managers, with the
United States struggling to shape global agendas.
These powers, especially China and India, will propagate their cultures, systems, and tastes. However,
“wild cards,” such as the collapse of China, should not
be ruled out. The complexity of the world will make
strategic planning a harder enterprise, with the functional approach to strategic planning becoming more
significant due to new technologies, economic sectors,
and associated risks.
In these conditions, the United States will still boast
the largest arsenal of world management resources,
but it will need to create an interagency strategic policy
planning unit and increase funding for related research;
strengthen the civilian components of military policy
as it relates to security, diplomacy, development, and
civilian-military partnerships; create culturally-aware
teams with expertise in reconstruction and rule of law;
and propagate legal regimes on the evolving definition
and practice of war and rules of war as part of military-to-military exchanges.
Concerning the technological trends, advances
in ICTs, biotechnology, genetic engineering, nano-
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technology, robotics, and applied cognitive science will
produce a mutated technology revolution that may
outdo in impact and extent the agricultural, industrial,
and information revolutions. With “singularity” on the
cards, nonlinear and disruptive technologies will force
rapid transitions of not only the technological, but also
cultural and socio-economic systems. Information age
and technology proliferation will touch many more
corners of the world, enabling more individuals and
groups to access more powerful, precise, and longrange weapons and mobilize against government
regimes. Meanwhile, the proliferation of autonomous
systems, cyber, space, and biotechnologies will expose
the military and civilian economies to blackmail and
attacks. A global Internet meltdown will be closer to
reality. The U.S. military should be able to operate in
an emergency network mode if the Internet breaks
down; design or refine global rules on disruptive technologies, wars, and special operations missions by
factoring in the emerging data-driven warfare and the
growing use of autonomous weapons systems; and
monitor global technological advancements while fostering R&D collaboration with allies and partners.
Speaking of the military trends, the United States
is on the cusp of another military revolution that feeds
on revolutions in military affairs and monumental
socio-economic, technological, cultural, and political
shifts. Expect a more rapid informatization and robotization of forces and war, advances and increased
reliance on space and cyber operations and precision
and autonomous systems, as well as the emergence of
new weapons and enhanced risks of WMD and missile
proliferation.
Big interstate wars will become less appealing, and
new conflicts and missions will emerge, focusing on
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the urban, cyber, space, and civilian protection operations involving smaller and more mobile forces. Information technology will enable the “New American
way of War.” However, advances in related enemy
capabilities will undermine the U.S. “technological
overmatch.” The militarization and exploitation of
space and cyber will increase. Truly autonomous systems will undermine human control and international
law, especially given unauthorized and deadly strikes
by such systems. Nuclear arms races will intensify due
to the increased reliance on space, the nuclearization of
civilian economies, and a larger number of actors seeking nuclear capabilities. Increased military capabilities
and security risks will prompt a counter-revolution,
accompanied by the development of asymmetric military capabilities, legal regimes, and societal responses.
To prepare for these dynamics, the U.S. military
should enhance the space and cyber domain adaptation and exploitation; develop a unified theory and
practice of joint cross-domain operations; advance
decentralization, experimentation, and autonomous
approach to military operations; develop low-tech
solutions for space and cyber vulnerabilities; increase
the experimentation of disruptive technologies (with
safeguards); stem the WMD and ballistic missile proliferation; and pursue an advanced global BMD program linking allied capabilities.
As far as the regional trends are concerned, a reformatted and converging global economic architecture
will emerge, featuring new winners and losers. More
actors will use enhanced economic capabilities to
advance their interests, with the United States exercising far less influence. Asia, with China and India as
its core, will return to primacy, producing the largest
share of the global GDP. Arms races, nationalism, and
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disputes over territories, technologies, and access to
resources will intensify. China, India, and the United
States will be performing a complicated strategic
“dance” in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, while global rivalry
will intensify in cyber, space, and the Global Commons over new markets, resources, and status. Elsewhere, select countries in the Middle East, Africa, and
Eurasia will emerge as success stories. Others will still
be prone to civil wars, proxy conflicts, resource wars,
climate change-induced stresses, and terrorist activity.
Foreign interventions will continue, but non-Western
powers will increasingly lead them.
The United States will rely more substantially on its
capabilities in the Arctic, cyber, space, and the Global
Commons. Its military posture will expand in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific and Latin America regions, but will
dwindle in Europe and the Middle East. To manage
regional security orders better, it will need to invest
more in strategic planning resting on regional and
functional blocks, while identifying the rising “stars”
in all regions early on and enhancing cooperation with
old and new partners and allies. It also should support
ally and partner integration institutions in Europe and
Asia, while promoting Eurasian economic connectivity. It should advance WMD and missile nonproliferation efforts while slowing down the militarization in
the Middle East, the Arctic, the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and
the Global Commons. Finally, it should deconflict relations between: Iran and Saudi Arabia; Turkey and Iran;
India and China; and continue investing in its military
capabilities—and those of its allies—to offset military
advantages sought by adversaries.
Taking these steps across these major megatrends
will position the U.S. military for another run—this
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time as a transformed, post-modern, flexible, super
expeditionary, and effective force.
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APPENDIX
CLIMATE CHANGE, WATER, AND RESOURCE
SCARCITY

Figure A-1. Projected Average Surface
Temperature Change.1

Figure A-2. Latin America and Africa are More
Concerned about Climate Change Compared with
Other Regions.2
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MILITARY AND CONFLICT TRENDS

Figure A-3. The Changing Character of Warfare.3

Figure A-4. Possible Proliferated Future.4
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

Figure A-5. World Population Living in Extreme
Poverty, 1820-2015.5

Figure A-6. In Emerging Economies, Incomes Are
Rising Faster, and at a Greater Scale, than at Any
Point in History.6
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Research and Development (R&D)
Investment—by Country or Region

USD Billion

The United States

403.7

EU-27

294.2

Japan

148.7

South Korea

43.9

China

120.8

Table A-1. Investments by Country or Region in
Research and Development (R&D).7
POPULATION AND AGING TRENDS

Figure A-7. Estimated Change in the Working Age
(15-64) Population 2015-2035, Selected Countries.8
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Figure A-8. Global Urban Population Growth is
Propelled by the Growth of Cities of All Sizes.9

Figure A-9. Population Change by Region,
2015-2035.10
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